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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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MAURITIUS

Berenger Urges Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

91AF0553Z Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in English
11 Jan 91 p 7

[“Text” of Paul Berenger’s speech at meeting of non-aligned participants at the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference on 8 January in New York City. Words in boldface as published.]

[Text] Mr President.

My delegation wishes to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Partial Test Ban treaty Amendment Conference as well as Mr Kheradi on taking up the position of Secretary General of the Conference. We keep hope that under your guidance we shall achieve success in spite of diverging positions, and reach a solution acceptable to all.

As mentioned earlier by other speakers, the Amendment Conference takes place against a mixed backdrop.

On the one hand, it is a fact that recent years have witnessed a significant improvement in the overall international political climate. We have entered the post-cold war period and are opening the door to what President Bush himself has called “a new world order.” The quantitative growth of the nuclear weapon arsenals has been stopped and the total number of nuclear-warheads in the world has started slowly to decline. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union has abolished a whole category of nuclear weapons and has introduced the most comprehensive nuclear verification provisions to date. The same two countries have agreed, after 16 years, to ratify the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has been signed in Paris in November last and has laid the foundation for what has been described here as a security architecture encompassing the whole of Europe.

On the other hand, it is also true that the global total of nuclear-warhead amounts today to some 50,000, deployed around the world and on the high seas. The qualitative growth of nuclear weapons goes on with such potential new weapons as nuclear-powered X-ray lasers including their way forwards the test sites. Reductions in nuclear arsenals in the United States and Soviet Union will be considerably less than the 50 percent promised earlier and Presidents Bush and Gorbachev have allowed their self-imposed end-of-the-year 1990 deadline for completing the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to elapse. In the First Committee and United Nations General Assembly this year, cold war voting patterns have remained. The Gulf Crisis has made the danger of nuclear weapons being used in regional conflicts more real than ever.

Mr President,

Mauritius would wish, on the occasion of the present Amendment Conference, to say once again, as President Gorbachev has been saying, that as far as nuclear weapons themselves are concerned, the final aim must remain their total elimination, in accordance with the Preambles to both the NPT and PTBT.

Mauritius disagrees with those who are eager proponents of the total elimination of chemical weapons but argue that nuclear weapons cannot be “disinvented” and that therefore a “balance of nuclear terror” is forever inevitable.

Long Overdue

We believe on the contrary that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is long overdue, and we fully concur with Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who observed in 1984 that such a Treaty was the “litmus test” of the real willingness of nuclear-weapon states and others to pursue nuclear disarmament.

Mr President,

Thirty-two years ago, President Eisenhower initiated negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban after declaring a moratorium on testing. Today, after more than three decades, two of the nuclear weapons states parties to the PTBT are unwilling even to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban, and two other nuclear weapons states have refused so far to sign the PTBT and have not even sent observers to the present Amendment Conference.

The first two nuclear weapon states referred to above have argued that continued nuclear weapons testing is necessary to maintain the reliability and safety of the existing stockpile and that appropriate verification of a complete test-ban would be impossible. These two arguments do not hold. The best experts have shown that the reliability of existing weapons can be assured in the future by a careful program of non-nuclear testing and replacement. The same experts have established that although compliance with a complete test-ban can never be verified with 100 percent certainty, a monitoring threshold is today technically possible which would exclude militarily significant clandestine tests.

As was put forcefully on Tuesday by Ambassador Thorin of Sweden, “nuclear testing in fact serves no other real purpose but to develop new and more effective nuclear weapons, whatever the present excuses are.” Put differently, others have stressed that the points and claims which have been advanced in opposition to a complete test-ban are not so much **reasons**, as might be advanced in a logical debate, as they are **reactions**, on the part of persons imbued with the conviction that a nuclear arms race is inevitable; that the only hope of security consists in staying ahead in that race and that this approach is now, and will continue to be, a necessary way of life.

Mr President,

Extending the NPT

We have been reminded here that the PTBT which has been in existence for 27 years and now has 118 States Parties to it, was the first global nuclear disarmament agreement, and that the present PTBT Amendment Conference constitutes the first truly multilateral negotiating forum on a nuclear arms treaty where all countries concerned, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, can participate fully and on an equal footing. It is equally true that the NPT, for all its virtues, is based on discrimination, whereas the PTBT is non-discriminatory, as would be a CTBT.

In fact, nuclear tests provocatively flaunt the discriminatory nature of the present non-proliferation regime which permits some states to improve their nuclear arsenals while others must forego nuclear arms.

In that sense, the fate of the PTBT and of an eventual CTBT is inevitably tied to that of the NPT and of its 1995 Extension Conference.

Mauritius is in favour of extending the NPT beyond 1995. It wishes to see all nuclear-weapon states sign the NPT and the NPT achieving universal status as soon as possible.

To that end, between now and 1995, Mauritius would wish to see as proposed by Egypt, and informal dialogue between the States Parties to the NPT and states that are not parties to the NPT, to examine proposals for improving the NPT by removing its major flaws, and to consider the possibility of calling an Amendment Conference between now and 1995 or in 1995 for that purpose.

Mr President, As was said on Tuesday by Ambassador Moussa of Egypt, while priorities do exist, all items on the disarmament agenda are interrelated.

Mauritius believes, as most of us here do that regional Treaties prohibiting the acquisition, control, manufacture and stationing as well as the testing of nuclear weapons, have a vital role to play even though, as was said by Ambassador Ordonez of Philippines, they are interim measures.

In that context, Mauritius is now actively promoting the concept of a South West Indian Ocean and Southern African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, along the lines of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga).

The presence of South Africa in the zone concerned raises delicate issues and the ANC [African National Congress] and others are being kept fully informed and consulted.

It is also evident that if South Africa were to join such a regional nuclear-free zone treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency would face new challenges in

devising a safeguard system for that country's nuclear facilities, thereby creating a very important precedent.

Mr President,

To come back to the present Amendment Conference, I wish to refer to the remark made on Tuesday by Ambassador Jayasinghe of Sri Lanka, that it was never the intention of the co-sponsors of the Amendment Conference that it should be terminated with one session. Indeed, we must recall that the recent General Assembly resolution 45/50 which relates to the present Amendment Conference, was approved with an important majority, and recommended the setting-up of "a working group or other measures it deems appropriate" to study certain aspects of a CTBT and to report its conclusions to the Conference.

It is also vital to keep in mind that confrontation must be avoided at all costs in the present Amendment Conference.

We wish in this regard to congratulate the two nuclear-weapon states opposed to amending the PTBT into a CTBT that have nevertheless fulfilled their duties as Depositary Governments of the PTBT and convened the present Amendment Conference.

We are certain that whatever decisions may be taken by the present Amendment Conference, they shall never act in breach of their obligations as Depositories of the PTBT.

Mr President,

Mauritius believes that this Amendment Conference should proceed along the lines recommended by the General Assembly Resolution 45/50.

Whatever happens here however, Mauritius hopes to see the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament carry on with its work in 1991 even without a negotiating mandate and with all five nuclear-weapons States participating.

Mauritius agrees that the mandate of the "working group" which resolution 45/50 recommends this Amendment Conference should set up, need not overlap with the work of the Geneva conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee, if we proceed with all required care here.

Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy

For our part, we would wish to see the "working group" deal with, among other things, the issue of provisions/sanctions aimed at ensuring compliance with an eventual CTBT as was proposed here by Ambassador Rozenthal of Mexico, and with the issue of so-called "nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" such as very low-yield nuclear fusion explosions relating to research on possible peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Should this Amendment Conference fail to set-up the "working group" proposed in General Assembly resolution 45/50, the next best option in our view would be for the present Conference to be postponed to meet again next year. It would then decide, in the light of the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, whether the "working group" should then be set up or whether this Amendment conference should then take any other decision.

Mr President.

Mauritius cannot accept the view that a comprehensive test-ban should be a long-term goal.

We have taken note, however, of the United States' recent statement to the effect that as the new verification protocols to the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties are put into practice, "the United States will be ready to propose negotiations on possible further nuclear-testing limitations that make sense from a national security stand-point, contribute to stability, and still permit the certainty of a reliable, safe and effective deterrent."

Others, arguing that arms control is the art of the possible, have proposed a phased process, with each step building on the success of the previous one, the number

and yield of nuclear tests decreasing from one step to the other until the goal of a CTBT is reached.

All avenues of progress should of course be explored.

But the fact remains in the final analysis that a CTBT is long overdue.

Mauritius hopes earnestly that by the combined results of our work here and at the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament as well as bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union and eventual nuclear test discussions involving also the three other nuclear weapon states, rapid progress will be made this year and next year in the direction of a long overdue CTBT.

Mr President, allow me to end by saying that this Amendment Conference has been unique in one other way. I refer here to the unprecedented involvement of certain NGO's [nongovernmental organizations], particularly Parliamentarians for Global Action and Greenpeace, in the convening and work of this Conference. This has served to remind us all that nuclear disarmament is everyone's business and not just the business of governments and of International Organizations.

Thank you, Mr President.

Official Addresses UN Confidence-Building Forum

*OW2501132991 Beijing XINHUA in English
1303 GMT 25 Jan 91*

[Text] Kathmandu, January 25 (XINHUA)—China attaches great importance to maintaining and promoting peace, security and development of the Asia-Pacific region, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official attending a regional meeting on confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region here has said.

The meeting is under the auspices of the United Nations Department of Disarmament.

Qin Huasun, a director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at the meeting that "the more urgent tasks facing the Asian-Pacific region today are: For one thing, the solution of hot-spot issues and bilateral disputes, for another, the strengthening of economic cooperation."

He said countries concerned should first strengthen their dialogues and consultations, and take practical measures to enhance trust, reduce tension, put an end to conflicts and strengthen security.

"On this basis," he believed, "they can gradually establish and develop regional security mechanisms, first in small areas, and then, gradually and as circumstances so required, extend them to larger regions."

Realistic and practicable confidence-building measures cover military and non-military ones, which are mutually complementary, he said.

Solutions to issues in Asia and the Pacific can only be found in the light of the specific situation and characteristics of the region. Experience gained in Europe can hardly apply to other regions where situation and conditions differ, he said.

Meanwhile, he pointed out that "the United States and the Soviet Union still maintain huge offensive armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including the army, the air force and blue-water fleets, posing a grave threat to other countries and exerting a negative influence on the political and security situation in this region."

In discussing the security of Asia and the Pacific, he stressed, this cannot but be taken as a priority issue.

He put forward seven non-military and six military suggestions, including the five principles for peaceful co-existence and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Comparison of Official at UN Confidence-Building Forum

OW2601094091

[Editorial Report] Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese at 1520 GMT on 25 January carries an

800-character report on the speech by Qin Huasun, director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region held in Katmandu on the same day.

The XINHUA Chinese version has been compared to the English version published above, revealing the following variations:

Paragraph three, XINHUA Chinese version reads: Qin Huasun [4440 5478 1327], director of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at the meeting that "the more urgent tasks facing the Asian-Pacific region today are: For one thing, the solution of hot-spot issues and bilateral disputes, for another, the strengthening of economic cooperation." (providing STC's for Qin Huasun's name and specifying his title)

Paragraph five, only sentence, XINHUA Chinese version reads: "On this basis," he believed, "they can gradually establish and develop regional security mechanisms, first in small areas, and then, gradually and as circumstances so required, extend them to larger regions."

Regarding the nonmilitary measures for building confidence, he suggested that under the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in one another's internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence, all nations establish and develop political, diplomatic, and economic relations; stop interference in, aggression against, and occupation of other countries; oppose expansionism; and settle disputes among nations through peaceful means.

Regarding the military or paramilitary measures for building confidence, he maintained that nuclear powers should guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations; that the nations concerned should establish nuclear-free or peace zones to avoid proliferation of nuclear weapons; that nuclear powers should respect the status of nuclear-free and peace zones; and that military bases, weapons, and armament, especially nuclear weapons, deployed in the territories of other countries should be dismantled, and troops stationed in other countries withdrawn.

Meanwhile, he pointed out that "the United States and the Soviet Union still maintain huge offensive armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including the army, the other countries and exerting a negative influence on the political and security situation in this region." (deleting paragraphs six and seven, adding two paragraphs)

Last paragraph, XINHUA Chinese version reads: "The three-day meeting opened yesterday. A total of 32 government officials, scholars and experts from 21 countries including China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Pakistan attended the meeting to explore measures to build confidence as well as ways and means to ensure security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region." (supplying variant last paragraph)

UN Official's Remarks at Confidence-Building Forum Reported

*OW2701021791 Beijing XINHUA in English
1601 GMT 26 Jan 91*

[Text] Kathmandu, January 26 (XINHUA)—A number of interesting confidence-building measures have been identified as potentially useful in addressing the security concerns of the states in Northeast and Southeast Asia, United Nations Under Secretary General Yasushi Akashi announced here today.

The announcement came in his closing statement of a three-day regional meeting on confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific region which was attended by 32 governmental and non-governmental representatives from 21 countries, including China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada and Japan.

The participants widely agreed it would be prudent for states in this region to adopt a step-by-step, gradualistic approach in their consideration of measures which could be adopted to enhance confidence and security at the unilateral, bilateral, sub-regional as well as regional level, he added.

He noted that measures to enhance security need not be limited to military ones, but also cover non-military ones—political, economic, humanitarian and other measures.

The Northeast Asia working group stressed that the outstanding issues in that sub-region should be solved primarily by the states themselves, with the participation of other states or international organizations as appropriate.

The Southeast Asia working group considered the suggestion that endorsement given to the 1976 treaty of amity and cooperation in Southeast Asia by the non-ASEAN members, as a first step towards a new inter-governmental mechanism for region-wide conflict resolution and cooperation. [sentence as received]

The regional meeting, sponsored by the United Nations department of disarmament, had been the second of the kind since the establishment of the Kathmandu-based U.N. regional center for peace and disarmament in Asia and Pacific on January 8, 1988.

AUSTRALIA

Defense Minister Urges West To Review Policies on Arms Sales

BK0102095991 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Australia's defense minister, Senator Robert Ray, says the West may have to review its arms export policies after the Gulf war and that Australia could have a role to play. Several Western countries, especially France and Germany, played a major role in arming Iraq during the 1980's, and Senator Ray says the government has rejected an approach by a foreign government to buy \$450 million worth of defense equipment, but he refused to identify the potential customer. Tony Hastings reports from Canberra;

[Begin recording] [Hastings] According to the defense minister, Australia has very strict guidelines limiting the sale of defense equipment to other countries which, he says, places Australia in a position to raise the question of curbing the international arms trade.

[Ray] We must learn some lessons from the Gulf, and I would have thought one of the key lessons to be learned from people is that Iraq has been supplied not only by the Soviet Union but by many Western European countries. The military strength has relied on that technology. When we go to the post-Gulf era those countries are going to have to consider very strongly will they continue to allow those sort of technology and weapons to be exported to countries such as Iraq. And we, if we are to make that point in international forum, will very much have to have clean hands.

[Hastings] Australia currently sells about \$300 million worth of defense equipment, about \$200 million short of the target set by the government three years ago. Senator Ray says Australia's policy is not to sell lethal weapons to areas of instability, but in apparent contradiction of that policy Australia sold 50 old Mirage fighters to Pakistan for \$36 million at a time when India and Pakistan were confronting each other over Kashmir. The Indians were outraged, but Senator Ray considers the sale was less significant.

[Ray] The devalued offensiveness of those weapons, I suppose, were questioned very much by the Indians. We no longer wanted them as we don't regard them as particularly effective weapons systems. The Pakistanis have a different view of them, but most of those decisions and agreements were made long before the tension between India and Pakistan had built.

[Hastings] Senator Ray would not reveal which country had recently offered to buy \$450 million worth of Australian defense equipment but had been rejected. However, he did say the mystery buyer was not the only potential customer to be turned down.

[Ray] By no means this is the largest. There have been several other proposals, all be they tentative, and involved far more money for this country. I think the other point I should stress is that there is a cost that comes with a decision not to be a major arms exporter. Because of economies of scale that means the Australian taxpayer will have to pay more for some of the defense equipment produced in this country, because they will not get the economies.

[Hastings] The defense minister says Australia has a ban on exporting weapons to a range of countries, including South Africa, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria and Israel. It is hard to imagine what equipment Israel would want to buy from Australia, but banning defense sales to the Israelis seems to fit only if you mean that the probable role of the Narrungar satellite base in South Australia is detecting SCUD missile attacks on Israel. [end recording]

INDONESIA

Foreign Minister Opens Regional Disarmament Workshop

BK2901112491 Jakarta ANTARA in English 1031 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Bandung, January 29 (OANA-ANTARA)—The reduction of tension and the process toward disarmament could be realized only if each nation in the world, each region and the international community does the same thing. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said here on Monday.

Opening a workshop on disarmament for the Asia-Pacific region attended by delegates from 21 countries, he said that nation, region and the international community are three mutually influencing and inseparable elements.

The security of a nation, he said, is an important factor for the region and, on the other hand regional and global security are also factors that affect the security situation of a nation.

On that consideration, efforts for the realization of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament among the strong nations, call for joint actions among nations and among regions, he said.

Disarmament also could not possibly be realized if any nation in any region decides by itself what may and may not be done in the disarmament effort.

According to Alatas, a regional approach could contribute to the realization of a general and comprehensive disarmament.

In this context, in the Asia-Pacific region which covers a wide area and is inhabited by more than half of the world's population an action toward disarmament needs to be launched, Alatas said.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. 'Disinformation' Over Scuds 'Intentional'

DPRK Denies Supplying Iraq

SK0202112091 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1100 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] Pyongyang, February 2 (KCNA)—Timing to coincide with the Gulf war gaining in scope, the U.S. authorities are carrying on a false propaganda against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which has nothing to do with it.

On February 1, the U.S. State Department reportedly stated that it pays heed to and is deeply concerned over the "report" that the DPRK has "supplied" Scud missiles to Iraq, making quite a noise as if the DPRK were violating UN sanctions against Iraq.

Earlier, on January 16, Pentagon spread a false rumour that the DPRK was "airlifting arms" to Iraq in violation of the UN economic sanctions against Iraq.

It goes without saying that such strange disinformation campaign is a cock-and-bull story they fabricated, urged by a sinister political aim to impair the international authority of the DPRK by misleading the world public opinion and divert elsewhere the world's attention from their criminal moves to escalate the war in the Gulf region.

As is known to all, as regards the Gulf situation, we call for an early end to the Gulf war, maintaining the principled stand that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of one country must not be allowed to be encroached on by other country and disputes must be settled by peaceful means, not with recourse to arms.

Nevertheless, the U.S. authorities are taking issue with us in a far-fetched manner after fabricating a fiction about "supply of missiles," ignoring this just stand of ours. This is an intentional provocation aimed at tarnishing the external image of our Republic and impairing our dignity and authority.

The United States must act with discretion, clearly mindful that such dastardly act of it as rashly taking issue with others who have nothing to do with the thing which it started and kicking up a row over it would only invite public criticism and accusations and land it in a more difficult position.

U.S. 'Lies' Denounced

SK0302002891 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2300 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] At the very time the war in the Gulf area is being further expanded, U.S. authorities are carrying out a deceitful commotion by blaming us for something with which we have no connection at all.

According to reports, on 1 February the U.S. State Department said that it is paying attention to reports claiming that we have been supplying Scud missiles to Iraq and that it is very worried about this fact. The U.S. State Department also babbled as if we were violating the United Nation's sanctions against Iraq.

Before this, on 16 January, the U.S. Department of Defense had spread fabricated rumors saying that we have violated the United Nation's economic sanctions against Iraq and that we have been transporting weapons to Iraq.

This kind of extraordinary commotion of lies and propaganda caused the world public opinion to make misinformed reports, defaming our Republic's international dignity. Needless to say, this is also an absurd fabrication which stems from the impure political attempt to turn the world's attention from their own criminal maneuver of expanding the war in the Gulf area.

SOUTH KOREA

DPRK Missile Production Capacity Discussed

SK0202085791 Seoul YONHAP in English 0824 GMT
2 Feb 91

[Text] Seoul, February 2 (OANA-YONHAP)—North Korea is capable of producing more than 50 surface-to-surface Scud-B missiles a year and has at least 12 launchers stationed near the truce line, a government official said Saturday.

The Scuds have a shooting range of nearly 300km, and military authorities here verified the presence of 12 mobile launchers about 40 to 50km north of the Demilitarized Zone [DMZ], the official, well-informed of inter-Korean affairs, said.

They are reported to be capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads, and there may be more of them yet undetected by authorities here.

North Korea is also equipped with more than 300 underground military fortresses that can produce mass munitions and hide more than 100 naval vessels and fighter jets, according to the official.

North Korea reportedly owns and already deployed approximately 30 SA-5 surface-to-air missiles with 300km shooting range, purchased from the Soviet Union, and can produce more than 100 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles with five km range every year.

Production lines for surface-to-surface missiles have been built in the vicinity of Pyongyang in 1987 and are putting out more than 50 Scud-Bs per year, the official said.

Pyongyang, according to the official, began test firings from 1984.

The North Korean missiles, 11.5m-long and 85cm in diameter, has a 300km range. When fired from near the border, they can target as far down as northern provinces of both Cholla and Kyongsang.

Pyongyang also began to improve its Scud-Bs from 1988 to double its range to 600km and can probably deploy them in actual service from 1992. The new version would put the entire Korean Peninsula within range, the official claimed.

The report comes after a Friday's statement by the U.S. State Department registering deep concern at reports that North Korea sold Scud missiles to Iraq. The official said Pyongyang is believed to have sold more than 100 warheads to Iran during 1988.

The official also said North Korea built some 300 underground military bunkers from 1983, all within 5 to 10km distance from the buffer zone.

North Korean defectors were quoted as telling authorities here that the elaborate bunkers lie 100 meters below ground and are built in various shapes to accommodate ground, naval and aerial combat gears.

Underground fortresses, protected by steel doors 3-meters thick, are fully equipped with command centers, communications and hospital facilities with all other necessary living arrangements.

These secretive facilities can shelter soldiers, military supplies, more than 10 naval vessels and between 70 to 100 fighter planes from heavy aerial bombardment, the official said.

North Korea also has hundreds of underground storage compounds for munitions and fuel in non-frontal areas while hiding most of the ammunition factories for protection from bombings, the official said.

North 'Heavily Involved' in Missile Production

*SK0402114791 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean
1100 GMT 4 Feb 91*

[YONHAP report from Tel Aviv]

[Text] Professor (Leshen), a researcher on military affairs and technology at Tel Aviv University in Israel, said North Korea has been deeply involved in producing and improving missiles in Iraq.

In a press interview today, Professor (Leshen) maintained that North Korea has been heavily involved in Iraq's production of Al-Husayn missiles with a range of 600 to 700 km. These missiles are an improved version of the Soviet-made Scud-B missile and of the Al-Abas missile.

He said these two missiles, widely known as joint products of Iraq and Egypt, are actually joint products of three countries—Iraq, North Korea, and Egypt.

TAIWAN

Defense Ministry Denies Having Chemical Arsenal

*OW0302052091 Taipei Domestic Service
in Mandarin 2300 GMT 1 Feb 91*

[Text] An official from the Defense Ministry spokesman's office pointed out yesterday that our country is a signatory of the Geneva Conventions and hence abides by the ban on the use of chemical weapons. The national army neither possesses nor is developing chemical weapons. The official said that in view of the fact that communist China has a great many chemical weapons, the national army has no choice but to increase antichemical-warfare efforts, production of protective gear, and antichemical-warfare training. Foreign media reports that our country might possess chemical weapons are completely untrue.

According to a 31 January report released by a U.S. Government scientific research group, 10 Third World countries are capable of launching poisonous gas, some have bacteriological weapons, and five small countries either have or are about to develop nuclear weapons.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Defense, Foreign Ministries on Soviet Troop Transit

LD2401213691 Prague CTK in English 2028 GMT
24 Jan 91

[Text] Prague, January 24 (CTK)—The possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany via Czechoslovakia will be discussed if the Czechoslovak Government is officially requested to do so by the German side, Czechoslovak Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky said here today.

Dobrovsky told a press conference after today's Cabinet meeting that the issue could be considered only after the departure of Soviet units from Czechoslovakia, which is likely to be finished by the end of February. Dobrovsky added that before allowing the transport of Soviet troops through Czechoslovakia, agreement must be reached also with neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry issued a statement on this issue, saying that preliminary talks, held at the request of German railways on January 21-23 at the Czechoslovak Transport Ministry, concerned only technical and financial aspects, and that a fundamental decision on the matter is up to the federal government and the parliament. The ministry statement did not expect any specific agreement on the issue to be reached before the pull-out of the remaining Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is completed.

Referring at the press conference to the Czechoslovak anti-chemical regiment in Saudi Arabia, Minister Dobrovsky said three soldiers wanting to return home will be substituted and further volunteers will reinforce the unit. He did not specify their number or date of departure.

Havel: Allowing Troop Transit 'Unwise'

LD2801132291 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1200 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Report on "Regular" briefing by Presidential Press Spokesman Michael Zantovsky to foreign and domestic reporters in Prague on 28 January]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The president of the Republic thinks that in the current situation, permitting Soviet troops withdrawing from the Federal Republic of Germany to transit Czechoslovak territory would be unwise. Vaclav Havel repeatedly stresses his support for a radical and fast economic reform, according to Zantovsky. He hopes that the Federal Assembly will approve a law on big privatization [privatization of large state-owned enterprises] as soon as possible. Zantovsky, however, did not rule out the possibility that the president will make a public statement on this issue in the near future.

Report on Nerve Gas Discovery in Gulf Unconfirmed

LD3001131191 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1200 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Text] Members of the Czechoslovak antichemical warfare unit in Saudi Arabia have discovered, in the course of tests carried out a few days ago, traces of nerve gas. The amount, however, was too insignificant to threaten the soldiers in the area. This was reported today by the U.S. Associated Press news agency [AP], which cited unnamed sources about the situation in the area of the find.

Specialists from the antichemical warfare survey, according to AP, have expressed a belief that the discovered gas came from an Iraqi factory damaged by a U.S. Air Force raid. The command of U.S. units in the Gulf has, however, not commented on this report.

In an interview with CTK, Major General Jiri Jinda, head of the Foreign Relations Department in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense, neither confirmed nor denied the AP report.

Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal Reported

LD0102210791 Prague CTK in English 1510 GMT
1 Feb 91

[Text] Prague, 1 February (CTK)—Forty-six out of a total of 83 Soviet garrisons in Czechoslovakia have been evacuated so far, reported Czech Minister of State Control Bohumil Tichy at a press conference today.

Soviet units made use of 13,000 hectares of soil and 6,500 hectares of forest, despite having initially requested only 4,000 hectares, said Tichy.

Soviet troops have been stationed in Czechoslovakia since the Warsaw Pact invasion on August 21, 1968. In Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations in February 1990 it was agreed that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn by June 30, 1991 but it now appears likely that all of them may be gone by the end of this month.

According to the Control Ministry 25.9 per cent of the 73,500 Soviet soldiers stationed in Czechoslovakia when the withdrawal began still remain. Also still remaining are 12.5 per cent of Soviet tanks, 11.3 per cent of armoured vehicles, 13 per cent of cannons and mortars, 28 per cent of automobiles and 39.8 per cent of airplanes. In addition 230,000 tons of various other material still remains, 18.6 per cent of what it was approximately one year ago.

Environmental inspections have already been carried out in 227 localities evacuated by Soviet troops, said the minister. Only 12 of them were considered clean, with damages estimated at 243 million crowns. The Soviet Union however accepts responsibility for only 74.7 million crowns in damages.

Minister Tichy emphasized the necessity of strict inspections during the evacuation of Soviet troops from their garrisons as well as at the border. The commissions overseeing the withdrawal must organize themselves better so as to be able to calculate precisely the damages caused by Soviet troops during their occupation, said Tichy.

HUNGARY

Ministry Spokesman on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU3001123991 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 26 Jan 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with Defense Ministry Spokesman Colonel Gyorgy Keleti by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "Arrears Are Compensated For"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Following the latest events in the Soviet Union, the world has begun speculating about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries of Eastern and Central Europe: Will the withdrawal take place within the stipulated time limit? We asked Colonel Gyorgy Keleti about the current withdrawal from Hungary of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary running according to plan?

[Keleti] A Hungarian-Soviet agreement signed on 10 March, 1990—and subsequently published—outlined the monthly pace at which the withdrawal of Soviet troops should take place. An addendum to the agreement gave a monthly breakdown of the number of Soviet soldiers, technological appliances, and trains transporting military equipment that should be withdrawn. Initially, these figures proved to be a realistic aim. Toward the end of 1990, however, we noticed that, although the planned number of units were leaving the country, the number of trains was still inferior to the number stipulated in the addendum. This clearly showed a planning error on the Soviet side; in other words, they had expected more trains than necessary. On one occasion, the Soviets wanted to transport a unit by using 25 military trains, where 19 trains would have sufficed. So, the addendum no longer reflected reality; for example, 957 military trains are scheduled to have left the country by the end of January 1991, but so far, only 876 trains have left. Taking these planning errors into account, we asked the Soviet military leadership to modify its calculations. As a result of this request, we have already received the new plans concerning the number of trains to be withdrawn. These plans are more realistic. Despite all this, we can state that the withdrawal of troops is running according to plan, and in some cases, we are even ahead of the plans laid down in March 1990.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Everyone is aware of recent events in the Soviet Union. Has the pace of withdrawal not

slowed down in recent days or weeks, as a result of these events in the Soviet Union?

[Keleti] The Soviets have not informed us of any intentions to slow down, and if I look at Friday's data, I can see that five trains were being loaded in various towns, three trains were on their way to the border, and a military trainload was being transferred at a border station. All this shows that things are running at a normal pace, and there is no slowdown.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are there any hitches, and if so, to what can they be attributed?

[Keleti] We have not heard of any major hitches that would have influenced the withdrawal of troops; however, it does sometimes happen that the Soviet railways do not send the right quantity, type, or quality of wagons to the Hungarian-Soviet border station, where the trainloads are transferred. Naturally, such mistakes have slowed down transfers on specific days, but the Soviets have always managed to make up for their unfinished duties.

[NEPSZABADSAG] According to our sources, Czechoslovakia is sending an additional contingent to its chemical defense unit in the Gulf region, and the CSFR is expected to replace a few of its soldiers upon the request of the soldiers themselves. Is Hungary going to extend the size of its medical unit in the Gulf, are there going to be any replacements, or have there been any preparations for a possible replacement of the unit?

[Keleti] When the medical unit departed for the Gulf, we informed the general public that the medical contingent was made up of volunteers who had undertaken to stay in the region for a maximum of six months. Yesterday, I inquired whether any of the volunteers wanted to come back to Hungary. According to the leader of the group, no one had asked to come back. We have no information concerning either a possible extension of the unit, or preparations for a possible replacement of the team.

Costs of Soviet Troop Pullout Discussed

LD2801151691 Budapest MTI in English 1414 GMT
28 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 28, 1991 (MTI-ECONNEWS)—A Soviet delegation led by Admiral Yuriy Grishin, first deputy of the Soviet minister for international economic relations, arrived in Hungary today to discuss the financial implications of the Soviet troops pull-out.

The talks are reported to concern the use of facilities vacated by the Soviet troops, including a hospital, in the form of joint ventures, claims connected with environmental damage caused by Soviet troops in Hungary, and the use of a former Soviet military aerodrome in Hungary.

A Hungarian Ministry of International Economic Relations official told ECONNEWS today that at earlier talks,

the Soviet Union stuck to its guns with its damage claim for 40 billion forints. The Hungarian party considers this claim both unjustified and exaggerated.

Hungary says that the majority of the facilities are so run-down as to be unfit for use for civilian purposes.

The Soviet party wants to have part of the outstanding Hungarian surplus of 1.3 billion USD [U.S. dollars]—piled up over the last two years—written off against their claim.

The Hungarian side, on the other hand, is firm on the point that payment of the Soviet debt and the financial implications of the pull-out cannot be linked.

Defense Ministry: Soviet Troop Withdrawal on Schedule

LD3102195291 Budapest MTI in English 1841 GMT
31 Jan 91

[Text] Budapest, January 31 (MTI)—The Soviet troops and military personnel scheduled to leave Hungary by the end of January have now left the territory of Hungary, MTI has learned from the Ministry of Defence.

The Soviet side has clarified the number of railway carriages it will be needing at the end of June, the deadline for the completion of the pull-out, and the monthly pacing of the deliveries. Accordingly, some 250 troops and goods vans will be necessary to implement the full troops withdrawal.

Resolutions on Soviet Withdrawal, Budget Delayed

LD3101135491 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 31 Jan 91

[Text] Now, the scene is the Interior Ministry. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the coordination of the financial issues is also continuously on the agenda, but not without its ups and downs. Because of this, Agnes Pap reports from a rather uneven news conference:

[Pap] It is not so easy to satisfy the evidently reasonable criterium that the financial and economic questions of the Soviet troop withdrawal should be agreed on with mutual regard for each others interests. The nearly 100 Soviet and Hungarian experts who have been negotiating since the beginning of the year were supposed to have prepared the draft agreement for today; it was to be considered at government levels that would contain the financial claims of the Soviet and Hungarian partners. This is now not expected to be ready before the end of the week. The only information that leaked from the strictly confidential discussions—behind closed doors—was that the delay is not due to the Gulf war. During the interval of the negotiations the radio reporter [not further identified] was told that troop withdrawals are progressing according to agreement and that the last Soviet soldier and equipment will leave the country by

the end of June, and that this negotiation will not influence the utilization of Soviet real estate left behind.

Independent Missile Unit Disbands 1 Feb

Chief of Staff Speaks at Ceremony

LD0102233691 Budapest MTI in English 1910 GMT
1 Feb 91

[Text] Budapest, February 1 (MTI)—The 5th Independent Missile Unit of Tapolca was disbanded on Friday, by order of the minister of defence, as missile deployments are being discontinued in the Hungarian Army as of February 1. The technology will be withdrawn from the Army, and will shortly either be sold-off or destroyed.

Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff of the Hungarian Army, said at the disbanding ceremony that long-range missiles were deployed in Hungary in the 1960's because the country's party and state leadership of the time believed that a serious external danger was threatening the European socialist countries, including Hungary.

"One should see that we were part of a military bloc, and the threat was not aimed against our country, but against the coalition," Borsits said. He then noted the Republic of Hungary does not have political aims which should be attained through military force, and that Hungary rejects war, and strives to prevent and avoid it. Defence is a basic element of its military policy, which implies setting up a smaller and more effective national army. Attack orientated weapons, which include missile technology, that generate mistrust will be replaced by conventional means that serve defence.

Official Details Dismantling

LD0202233291 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Interview with (Mihaly Boti), deputy secretary of the Defense Ministry, by Gyula Horvath; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] As of 1 February the Defense Ministry has dismantled the last Hungarian missile unit [raketaegyseg]. With this, Hungary is the first in the Warsaw Pact to begin the destruction [megsemmisites] of her offensive weapons and the creation of conventional defensive units.

[Horvath] Twenty-five offensive weapons are being dismantled. Moreover, [they include] medium-range surface-to-surface missiles also suitable for targeting nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

[Boti] One of the missiles is the prototype [alaptipus] of what I can describe as the notorious Scud-type [missile], about which we now hear a great deal in connection with the Gulf war. This is a weapon with a maximum targeting range of 300 kilometers. Another type is a smaller

missile that can be deployed up to a firing range of some 70 kilometers. These missiles will be taken apart, and, in the technical sense of the word, destroyed [megsemmisít].

[Horvath] Does this mean that there will not be any surface-to-surface offensive missiles in Hungary then?

[(Boti)] If you please, there will not remain any guided missile weapon belonging to this category in the Army's weapons system with which one can fire with on-the-spot accuracy. Naturally, I cannot promise that there will never be, not even in the future, any missile—this type, this category of missile weapon—in the system of the Hungarian Army. What I can say without any doubt is that the Hungarian Republic will not systematize missiles for carrying warheads capable of mass destruction. This is simply irreconcilable with our defense concept.

Troops Talks With Soviet Experts Concluded

LD0302200691 Budapest MTI in English 1646 GMT
3 Feb 91

[Text] Budapest, February 3 (MTI)—Hungarian and Soviet experts have concluded a round of talks in Budapest on the economic and financial aspects of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

The Hungarian delegation was headed by Brigadier General Imre Karacsony, deputy government commissioner, and the Soviet delegation by Admiral Yuri Grishin, first deputy of the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations.

The sides compiled a draft inter-governmental agreement which included both the paragraphs they agreed upon and the positions that were still different. They agreed to inform the competent organs of their countries about the outcome of the talks, and resume the negotiations in the near future. The delegations shared the view that mutual compromises would offer a genuine chance for eliminating the differences of opinions.

Prime Minister on Arms Trade, USSR Troop Withdrawal

LD0402151291 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1406 GMT 4 Feb 91

[Statement by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall at the National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker, esteemed House. Before we begin the debate of the draft bill on property compensation, which is of such outstanding importance from the viewpoint of the transformation, and which we naturally consider a fundamental issue of the transformation, alongside developing the system of political institutions, we consider it to be a fundamental draft bill and a measure pertaining to property and justice. Before we go on to this, however, I would like to make two announcements and at the same time I would indicate the following:

We handed over to the speaker of the House on the government's behalf the letter dated 1 February in which the government asks that, in accordance with the relevant legal provisions, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees should hold a joint session where the government wishes to give a briefing about Hungarian participation in the international arms trade and in connection with the previous Yugoslav arms sale which has cropped up now. The government has handed this over to the Speaker of Parliament and it requests the convening of the two committees in accordance with this.

Furthermore, I would also like to announce by way of information that last week in Budapest there took place expert discussion in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, led on the Soviet side by Admiral Grishin, and now, with the leadership of Lieutenant General Shilov, the newly appointed commander of the Southern Group of Forces, the further discussion are beginning. The topic of the debate is that the Soviet side wishes partial reimbursement even before the withdrawal has been completed, whereas the Hungarian stance is that we adhere to a joint accounting on the basis of the total balance, taking the losses and costs into consideration. Otherwise, the Soviet troop withdrawals are proceeding according to schedule. Thank you. [applause]

POLAND

Deputy Minister on Soviet Pullout, Transport

AU2801150391 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
23 Jan 91 n 2

[Interview with Deputy Transport Minister Witold Chodakiewicz by Maria Wagrowska; place and date not given: "Transit and Pullout of Soviet Forces—In What Way?"]

[Text] [Wagrowska] Is there agreement on the way Soviet troops stationed in Germany and in Poland are to be withdrawn and transported to the USSR?

[Chodakiewicz] Theoretically, these forces could be transported and withdrawn using all the available means of transport. In practice, however, we want to restrict it to rail transit and only in some cases are we prepared to allow road convoys.

[Wagrowska] Is this because of the railway's large carrying capacity, or is it for security and environmental reasons?

[Chodakiewicz] Sea transport for Soviet units stationed in Poland is almost out of the question. It is hard to imagine tanks rumbling through the center of Szczecin to be loaded onto container ships and sailing to Leningrad. We are also concerned that ships from Rostock carrying Soviet troops from Germany should not sail through Polish waters.

There will be very limited air transport using Polish civil aircraft and possibly Polish Air Force planes. The Soviet side will have to pay for using Polish airspace just like any other country, even if it chooses to use its own planes.

Other factors are important when considering road transport. We are agreeable to allowing the simultaneous transit of two road convoys of up to 200 trucks (with trailers), traveling at a speed not exceeding 15 km per hour. It would cause great difficulties if we allowed these convoys to proceed by the central west-east route through Poznan, Warsaw, then onto Moscow or the Baltic republics.

Given this situation, it leaves, theoretically at least, two other routes—namely, the northern and the southern routes. In reality it leaves only the northern option, because this is shorter (about 450 km), and it is possible to do it in three day stages (two overnight stops). The southern route is twice as long and we are not really taking it into consideration. Along the northern route, we would have to build two new bridges, several viaducts, straighten out bends, widen the road and provide overtaking stretches. This is not something I have just thought of. These are recommendations made by a report of the Highways and Bridges Research Institute. According to our estimates, these works would cost about a billion dollars and we would ask for half of this sum as a down payment before we begin construction. The route could become fully operational in September. We cannot "cut off" northern Poland during the summer holiday season. We would also have to prepare maintenance and repair workshops along the route and so forth. One must also take into account the fact that some transports will have dangerous cargo and there is our wish to avoid any incidents along the route. Except for Soviet sentries, other Soviet personnel should not carry arms. In a democratic country like Poland, we must listen to the voice of the local population. Relevant township and city authorities that will be affected by this transit are being informed of developments.

Thus, rail transport, successfully used over the years to supply Soviet units, is really the best option.

[Wagrowska] Do Polish railways have sufficient capacity to undertake this sort of operation?

[Chodakiewicz] I must confess that the Soviet side is anxious to know whether their forces in Germany will all transit through Poland within four years, seeing that their forces stationed in Poland are to leave at the same time. In conjunction with this, Polish railways have prepared a plan which is now ready to go operational. We have suggested eight to 12 transit trains per 24 hours. These trains would cross central Poland along four routes and then carry on to the north or the south of the USSR. We also want to use the special so-called steel and sulfur line, the only wide-gauge railway through eastern Poland. It is currently underutilized (only four trains per 24 hours). We have suggested that the Soviet Army can reload on the Slawkow Poludniowy, Sedziszow, Wola

Baranowska, and Zamosc railway stations that use this line. That is to say, Polish trains would pull in to these stations and the reloading onto the larger Soviet trains could take place there. The ramps at these stations make such an operation possible. Soviet property from Lower Silesia and southern Germany could be transported there and this would solve the anticipated "bottleneck" at the Malaszewicze-Brzesc border crossing. This is a very practical suggestion and General Klemenov, deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Army, has conceded that it would be a good solution. The other problem is the loading of military equipment. We have offered the services of heavy cranes from various Polish enterprises.

[Wagrowska] Can you give the proportion of rail traffic to other transit traffic?

[Chodakiewicz] In general terms, the split will be 80-85 percent rail transit and a maximum of 10-15 percent road transit. If I were thinking solely in financial terms, I would perhaps be inclined to accept the money for the improvement of highways and the dues for road transit, but given the difficulties of foreseeing the way the situation in Europe will develop—after what has happened in Lithuania—I remain convinced that the best option is rail.

[Wagrowska] Are you saying that the transport of Soviet troops through Poland may hold some dangers for us?

[Chodakiewicz] I am not saying anything, but the statement made by General Dubynin, commander of the Soviet Army Northern Group, has given me a lot to think about. He said that the Soviet side does not agree to its troops being transported in sealed rail cars and escorted by Polish security personnel. If they have to leave in such a way, then it is better they unfurl their battle standards and march their way to the Soviet Union, their great fatherland and world superpower. I told him that each country has its own battle standards, and we could also unfurl ours, but we called the meeting to agree on concrete technical matters.

[Wagrowska] You are a member of the Polish negotiating team. Do you think that political factors are stopping the final agreement from being signed?

[Chodakiewicz] Without a shadow of doubt. The draft of the treaty on withdrawal and transit is ready for signature, but we are still waiting to agree on the date. During our talks in Moscow, I had the distinct feeling that we were dealing with two Soviet delegations, one in civilian and the other in uniform dress. The head of the Soviet delegation told us that the date would be fixed during Marshal Yazov's Warsaw visit. We shall see.

[Wagrowska] In this context, what is your opinion of the present attempts by Soviet trains full of soldiers and military equipment to cross Poland? Is there perhaps a link with the events in the Baltic republics?

[Chodakiewicz] All trains that were not previously agreed upon and not on the schedule were stopped. They

were allowed through later after requests made by the Soviet side and as a gesture of our goodwill to make negotiations easier. We told the Russians that we do not want to see any such trains on our border crossing points before the treaty is signed.

In statistical terms, there are currently 1.2 Soviet trains crossing Poland every 24 hours (a train usually consists of 40 rail cars and weighs up to 1,000 tonnes).

[Wagrowska] The Poles and Soviets have agreed that the whole transport operation is to be on commercial lines, but apparently Poland has demanded three to four times as much money as the Soviets are willing to give. What is the situation?

[Chodakiewicz] Polish State Railways and the USSR Ministry of Transport have held talks on this matter recently. The Russians did not accept our conditions and negotiations are continuing. Both sides are agreed that the rates to be charged for the transport will be fixed according to prevailing international railway freight tariffs. The Russians, however, want us to apply a discount and reduce our charges to the level that applies in foreign trade between other European countries. They have said that they are guaranteeing us "business" for four years. Our reply was that we shall have trains that have to return "empty."

[Wagrowska] Is there a danger that rail strikes could prevent the conclusion of any deal?

[Chodakiewicz] The salaries demanded by the unionists and the anxieties that this arouses are one side of the coin. The provision of rail services for the planned withdrawal and transport is something else. I think that the transport and withdrawal operations of Soviet troops will bring in money for Polish State Railways and its employees. I do not think that these internal problems on the railway pose any such threat.

Foreign Minister on Soviet Troops, Baltics

AU3001114191 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 24 Jan 91 pp 10, 11

[Interview with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Edward Krzemien and Marek Rapacki; place and date not given: "Nothing About Poland Should Be Decided Without Poland's Participation"]

[Excerpt] [GAZETA] The Latvian foreign minister recently referred to a statement that Shevardnadze allegedly made last October. Shevardnadze reportedly said that if the Soviet Army and Party-military complex begin to use force, they will not stop at the Baltic countries but will proceed to Central Europe to try and win back what they lost there.

[Skubiszewski] No, I am not afraid of any Soviet military action against Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia. The changes are so far advanced that no military action can

stop them and the West, especially the United States, would not tolerate such an action. NATO is a part of the European security system and cannot remain indifferent toward any threats to Central Europe.

That does not mean that the geographic borders of NATO have changed; however, with the coming of independence to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and the changes to Romania and Bulgaria, not to mention the unification of Germany, the European setup has altered. NATO's role in this new setup has also altered. That organization cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in Central and Eastern Europe. The events in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics are causing anxiety among various circles that deal with international politics, but I think the USSR will not go beyond a certain limit of activity. That limit is our eastern border. So I do not share your fears, gentlemen, but still we must be careful.

[GAZETA] Talks on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and the transit of forces from the former GDR have reached a deadlock.

[Skubiszewski] As far as the text of the two agreements on this subject between Poland and the USSR are concerned, there is no deadlock. The only problem is the date of the withdrawal. To be honest, no date has been decided upon, and only if this state of affairs continues will one be able to talk of a deadlock.

The Soviet side has not agreed to our suggestion of completing the withdrawal of the Soviet forces by the end of 1991. In any case we are flexible, and we can accept delays, but the USSR should make itself clear on this issue.

Was it possible to bring about an earlier withdrawal of the Soviet forces? No, gentlemen, it was out of the question. It is only possible to discuss this issue in the present international situation. This situation has its ups and downs. Right now, it is down.

The Polish Government submitted its demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces in April 1980, after which we prepared ourselves for this topic very carefully. In the summer we conveyed two notes to the USSR. In October I discussed the subject with Minister Shevardnadze, and he completely agreed to the withdrawal and to talks. We began the talks in November.

One thing is sure: The USSR was not in any hurry to hold them. Anyone could see that this was a very difficult topic and that no Polish demand would resolve it, not even from the most authoritative person's lips.

Because of the domestic situation in the USSR, it is now being said that it was a mistake to conclude agreements about withdrawing the Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. One cannot view matters in terms of mistakes; one has to view them in different categories. The Soviet presence in the independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe is now an anachronism.

Soviet forces are not needed there to protect any Soviet interests. Soviet security will be fully guaranteed by means of good European cooperation, and the question of whether the Red Army should be on the Elbe or the Bug River is meaningless. The presence of two divisions in Poland, air force groups, and certain individual units is of no military significance.

Nevertheless, the Army has its own way of thinking, most of it antiquated, which I do not hesitate to call Stalinism. Stalinist thinking involved a desire for territorial gains, an expansion of Soviet borders, and a military presence. Today, such an approach yields nothing at all. One can have far better security and considerably better economic cooperation if one is not controlled by any other country and one has good relations with independent countries.

Sooner or later the Baltic countries will have independence, only it will take a long time. I fear that Vilnius thinks it is a straightforward process. It cannot be achieved by means of a single declaration of independence. It requires an effort lasting many years.

[GAZETA] Poland insists that the Soviet forces leave Poland before they leave Germany, but the Soviet Union wants its forces to leave Germany first. A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet recently tried to convince our parliamentary deputies about the correctness of the Soviet view. Now there is talk of a forthcoming visit by Soviet Defense Minister Yazov, who will probably try to make us change our minds.

[Skubiszewski] Marshal Yazov is probably not coming yet. The military talks will have to be held in any case, but the issue will be decided by the political talks now being held by the Foreign Ministry.

We think the Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Poland before the huge evacuation of the Soviet forces in Germany in 1992-93. The evacuation should be completed in 1994, but I expect it to be completed sooner. In any case, the idea of the Soviet forces leaving Poland only after they have left Germany is quite unacceptable.

That is why the Polish Government proposed an earlier date for the withdrawal: the end of 1991. We did not want the Soviet withdrawals from both countries to coincide.

One should add that the Soviet forces in Poland are not numerous. Due to public pressure, their withdrawal is an internal political problem, as it were. But their presence is not part of any political pressure. There has not been any such pressure.

[GAZETA] Will the continued presence of these forces in Europe not make our access to Europe more difficult?

[Skubiszewski] Neither the Council of Europe nor the EEC are questioning our sovereignty. If we had already held the parliamentary elections, we would now be a member of the Council of Europe, even though the Soviet forces are still in Poland. This problem may arise

later, especially during the integration of Western Europe; therefore, our links with Europe also necessitate the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

The presence of foreign forces in a country with that country's permission does not violate that country's sovereignty, especially with such a small number of troops, otherwise one would have to say that Germany is not a sovereign country because there are so many American and Soviet troops there.

[GAZETA] Our Lithuanian friends do not want the Soviet forces in Germany to be evacuated by the so-called northern route. The Lithuanians wanted to express this desire in Warsaw. Yet that is exactly the route we are choosing as the only suitable transit route through Poland.

[Skubiszewski] First, I have never heard of any such Lithuanian desire. If there had been one, it should have reached us. I have spoken to Lithuanian Foreign Minister Saudargas several times and we discussed the most varied matters, but never did this subject come up.

We cannot look after the interests of all others. Even so, we have gone further than other countries concerning Lithuania. From the point of view of Polish requirements, the northern route is the best one, and it is these requirements that we have to mainly consider. The route the Soviet forces take when leaving Germany has no effect whatsoever on Lithuania's fortunes. By the northern route, one can direct one or two divisions via Lithuania. It would only take a few hours.

There have also been various Soviet accusations about us blocking the transit of Soviet troops. They are untrue. Routine military transits are taking place, just as they have done for years. There are two, even three trains a day.

The latest difficulties concerning unscheduled transits arose purely through the USSR's fault, because the USSR does not want to conclude a transit agreement with Poland. It should be concluded at the same time as the agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

One cannot have a situation where a train arrives at the border and the driver calls out: "We are coming through now." This has to be arranged with Poland beforehand, not just with Germany. I fear that the military people in Moscow do not understand that, but they will have to. The sooner they understand it, the better for our relations, because our relations must be good. They must be tidied up.

Let me add that we have done both the USSR and Czechoslovakia a favor by agreeing to the transit of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia via Poland by the southern route. We will also do Germany a favor. Everyone wants the Soviet forces in Germany to leave, but that has to be arranged beforehand.

[GAZETA] Was Poland's refusal to admit two Soviet military trains recently just an incident?

[Skubiszewski] When we were told with just a few days' notice about a large number of extra transports, I replied that without an agreement, there can be no transports. First we will conclude an agreement, and then there will be transports, I said. That is logical and quite acceptable to our partners. That was my decision, and the prime minister confirmed it.

When trains arrived at the border without any documents or permits, we did not let them through. When one train was let through by mistake, I said we should not turn that into a problem. The train was also carrying passengers, and we would have caused them difficulties.

[GAZETA] Another Lithuanian complaint is that the Polish-Lithuanian declaration is being prepared too slowly. We already have such declarations with Russia and the Ukraine. [passage omitted]

Action Against USSR General Dubynin Urged

*PM3001170191 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
26 Jan 91 p 5*

[Marek Henzler article: "Brandishing the Barrel: After General Dubynin's Statement"]

[Text] On 15 January this year ZNAMYA POBEDY—the paper for the Soviet troops stationed in Poland—printed a statement by their commander, Colonel General Viktor Dubynin, issued several days earlier in Moscow during the third round of Polish-Soviet talks concerning Soviet troops' withdrawal from and transit through Poland. Once the statement has been published in the paper, it became a public declaration and acquired official status.

Gen. V. Dubynin accused the Polish side of treating Soviet troops as an army of occupation and wanting to escort them out of Poland as prisoners of war, "in locked and sealed railroad cars, disarmed, and carrying no military equipment," thus bringing dishonor on the army which liberated us and vanquished the Nazis, which "returned East Pomerania, East Prussia, and Silesia to Polish people to hold in perpetuity, and also established Poland's western border along the Odra and Nysa [Oder-Neisse]," and which, moreover, acting out of internationalist duty, for 45 years "protected and defended your country without charge."

We could, at a pinch, abstain from refuting the above points in a polemical reply. I am surprised, however, to see that to date Polish authorities have failed to react appropriately to a further passage in the statement where

the Soviet general declares point-blank that "if the Polish side disagrees with the Soviet protocol governing questions concerning legal and financial matters as well as those concerning property, and if it fails to show good-will, the Soviet troops will in any case enter the territory of that great power, the Soviet Union, according to our own plans and moving along the routes we have mapped out ourselves. And then we will be responsible only for the life and welfare of Soviet citizens, and we will disclaim any responsibility for the Polish side." The statement concludes with an assertion that until such time as Soviet troops withdraw in full from Germany, "there can be no talk at all" of any withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

Gen. V. Dubynin did not arrive in Poland yesterday, and we can assume he is aware of the 1956 agreement—still in force—between the Polish and Soviet governments. Article 1 of this agreement states that "Temporary stationing of Soviet Armed Forces units in Poland may not in any way infringe the sovereignty of the Polish State, nor may it lead to their interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic." Article 2, paragraph 2 stipulates that "movements of Soviet troops within the territory of the Polish People's Republic outside the sites where they are stationed will in all instances require the consent of the government of the Polish People's Republic or the appropriate authorities empowered by that government." Gen. Dubynin's statement challenges both these points of the intergovernmental agreement and constitutes a wholly unjustified threat of an infringement of our sovereignty, to be carried out if Poland does not alter its stand on the question of withdrawal and transit passage of Soviet troops.

Some might say that the abovementioned statement by the Soviet general should be regarded as the dregs of the old, imperialist way of thinking as well as an expression of a divergence of opinions on issues of international policy between the Army and the politicians even within the USSR itself. However, Gen. Dubynin's position is not just that of commander of Soviet troops in Poland, but predominantly—as he even stressed in his statement—that of Soviet government plenipotentiary for matters concerning Soviet troops' stay in Poland. This is why we must not underestimate or minimize the weight of his statement. We should take a stand on it according to diplomatic protocol, which allows for a variety of forms in which a reaction may be expressed: from passing the issue over in silence right through to declaring a representative of the foreign government persona non grata...

ARGENTINA

Foreign Minister Charges Alfonsin Regime Aided Condor Project

PY2601150491 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
1003 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 26 January (TELAM)—In a letter answering former Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena, Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo has verified the existence of two secret decrees that allowed development of the Condor-2 missile during former President Raul Alfonsin's administration. Cavallo's letter says it is absolutely true that with the authorization of two secret executive branch decrees that were similar in general terms—Decree No. 604, dated 9 April 1985, and Decree No. 1315, dated 13 August 1987—missile technology was transferred to Iraq which is where the funds to finance the Condor-2 came from.

In his letter, Minister Cavallo asserts that this was possible because the aforementioned decrees authorized the financing of technological development through a balanced exchange of space [espacial] industry materiel.

Cavallo also tells Jaunarena that the very serious political mistake made by the government to which you belonged does not lie so much in the country to which the technology was supplied and which generated the funds—a country which at that time was purchasing weapons from practically every Western country—but rather in allowing national territory to be used for activities designed for the proliferation of missiles.

In this regard, Cavallo reminds the current president of the Radical Civic Union's [UCR] National Defense Committee that there are international restrictions on the production of missiles and the promotion of activities linked to the production of missiles, adding that Argentine institutions participated in these activities.

Referring to Decree 1315, which was signed by Jaunarena, Cavallo notes that the decree cited the convenience of taking advantage of the possibility of locally conducting a large number of activities that, according to the respective contracts, were originally to be conducted abroad.

Minister Cavallo emphasizes this point by asserting that at that time intelligence reports from various Western countries noted that several foreign enterprises with which Argentina had signed contracts—the same ones that managed to close the deal with Iraq—had been banned from conducting these activities in their own countries.

Cavallo then says that the technological development was not autonomous, but a compensation mechanism that allowed Argentina to obtain technology for its foreign partners under the condition that the technology transfer be made from Argentine territory. According to

the foreign minister, the technology transfer was meant for a country that was willing to pay a lot of money for it, meaning Iraq.

Cavallo tells Jaunarena: I cannot publish all the documents about this project because they are secret. Nonetheless, Cavallo sent the UCR leader a copy of Decree No. 1315, signed by Alfonsin and Jaunarena, adding that Jaunarena can decide whether or not to make it public.

The foreign minister then adds that as for Decree No. 604—signed by Alfonsin, former Defense Minister Raul Borras (deceased), former Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, and former Economy Minister Juan Sourrouille—I have no problem in personally giving it to any of those who signed the letter Jaunarena sent through UCR leader Raul Alconada Sempe.

As you may notice, the letter continues, the decrees effectively approve, without reservations, several contracts and the formation of firms whose documents were not included in the files—as they were supposed to be—but remained in the Defense Ministry where you will be able to examine them if you request.

Cavallo recalls that Jaunarena met with former U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and Caputo met with former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz on several occasions.

According to what I was told, Cavallo states, during those meetings you received intelligence that you later conveyed to me, to former Defense Minister Humberto Romero, to Secretary of State James Baker, and to Defense Secretary Richard Cheney.

Therefore, says Cavallo, you have all the documents on the activities developed during your administration regarding the proliferation of Argentine missile technology, and you may realize that none of my comments contradict reality.

The minister explains: Naturally, I have not mentioned the names of people and companies or some other details that are part of the operation's secrecy. I believe, however, that this information could easily be given to a congressional investigative committee. Cavallo asserts to Jaunarena that in view of the issue's far-reaching repercussions, he has always been very cautious whenever he referred to it in the various countries he visited or whenever he answered foreign journalists' questions.

He then says: When I mentioned the issue on journalist Liliana Lopez Foresi's program, I wanted to show the connection I believed existed between the role of customer that Iraq played during the UCR administration and the instructions former Foreign Minister Caputo sent the Argentine representative to the UN Human Rights Committee. According to Cavallo, those instructions were that Argentina should abstain from condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its Kurds.

Cavallo then refers to some comments in Jaunarena's letter stating that in February and March 1990—during the Justicialist administration—the Argentine representative to the UN Human Rights Committee refused to comply with the Western delegations' request that she not vote against visiting Iraq or at least, abstain from voting.

Cavallo denies that such a request was made and points out that on that occasion the UN Human Rights Committee was merely voting on a procedural issue—whether to visit Iraq at Iraq's invitation or as a result of an exclusive UN decision.

Cavallo explains that Ambassador Zelmira Regazzoli did not receive specific instructions from the Foreign Ministry at the time because the issue had been discussed openly. He added that she voted as Argentina has always voted—without taking into consideration what country is being voted on.

Before placing himself at the disposal of UCR government officials to discuss any matter they may feel is necessary, Cavallo emphasizes that the Argentine position on whether to answer the invitation of a country to be visited was amply discussed when the same principle was adopted during voting on Cuba while Caputo still headed the Foreign Ministry.

Former Defense Minister Rebuts Condor 'Lie,' Blames UK

PY3001231491 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 30 Jan 91 p 11

[Excerpts] (NA-DYN)—Former Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena yesterday continued his exchange of accusations with Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo over the alleged sale of Condor II missiles to Iraq by the Radical administration.

In a letter Cavallo sent Jaunarena which was distributed to the press last week, the future Economy Minister said he had evidence of sale of Argentine weapons to Iraq but Jaunarena said the accusation was "a total lie" and repeated what he had said several times before: That there was no such sale.

This time, however, he stressed that Cavallo's information on the alleged sale came from British intelligence.

Jaunarena stated that during the 1983-1989 Radical administration the British secret service was spreading false news about Argentine weapons sale to Iraq to bring the international support for Argentine Malvinas claims down and prevent Argentina from making scientific developments in arms technology.

The aide of ex-President Raul Alfonsin commented that "the fact that such a rumour would reach Cavallo is understandable. The fact that he could have believed it is alarming."

In his letter, Cavallo had pointed out that "the worst political mistake of your government on this issue was not to sell technology to Iraq, which was something many Western countries were doing at the time, but to allow the national territory to be used for the proliferation, production and sale of missiles which are strictly forbidden according to international law."

In relation to this last statement, Jaunarena underlined that "what the Radical government tried to do is to develop that technology by our own means, and from the moment we started doing that we received heavy pressure, especially from the United States government."

The ex-minister explained that in his opinion Argentina should renounce building missiles only if other countries agreed to do so too.

Jaunarena contended that Cavallo's accusations "are a move to divert public attention from the real issue today, which is the decision of the government to send Argentine troops to the Persian Gulf." [passage omitted]

Finally, the Argentine Commission of Solidarity with the Iraqi People carried out last night a rally "to repudiate the imperialistic aggression and to demand the immediate return of the Argentine vessels" operating in the Gulf area.

The Patriotic Movement of Liberation, which organized the rally together with the Revolutionary Communist Party and the People Labour Party, yesterday highlighted "the brave and firm decision of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to recover part of his nation's territory and not to give in before the pressure of the international coalition which has started a genocide against the Iraqi people."

INDIA

Pakistan Nuclear Test Ban Proposal Rejected

BK1201010291 Hong Kong AFP in English 1716 GMT
11 Jan 91

[Text] New Delhi, January 11 (AFP)—India has again rejected a Pakistani proposal for a regional nuclear test ban treaty with Pakistan on the grounds that any nuclear ban must be global.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said here Friday that India believed the nuclear issue should be tackled "in a global framework".

"We do not accept the contention that it can be dealt with in a bilateral or South Asian regional context," he said.

Pakistan's representative at the United Nations had repeated his government's stand that Islamabad was ready to sign a joint declaration with New Delhi renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, and to conclude a mutual inspection of nuclear facilities agreement.

India first exploded a nuclear device in 1974, but said it was committed to peaceful use of atomic energy, and experts say Pakistan, with which India has fought three wars, perfected a nuclear device last year.

On the same grounds India has refused to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, calling it "discriminatory."

IRAN

Mass Production of Long-Range Missiles Planned

LD2901115491 Tehran IRNA in English 1101 GMT
29 Jan 91

[Text] Tehran, January 29 (IRNA)—Iran is to start mass production of long-range ground-to-ground missiles as of Monday, Februray 4, announced spokesman of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, Hojjat ol-Eslam Alawi here Tuesday.

Hojatt ol-Eslam Alawi said the missiles which have high destructive power would be mass produced by the military industries of the Defence Ministry.

GENERAL**Baltics Disavow Any Desire for Nuclear Weapons**

91UF0303A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 12 Dec 90 p 1

[Declaration signed by I. Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Latvian Republic, K. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, E. Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Republic Government, in Tallinn on 8 December: "Declaration on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] In recent times a number of the highest leaders of the Soviet Union have expressed the fear, and sometimes made direct accusations against the Baltic states—sovereign republics striving to attain independence—that they desire to gain possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, by speculating in this regard and deluding world public opinion, certain circles in the Soviet Union are attempting to limit the sovereignty of the republics and interrupt the process of their movement towards independence.

In connection with this, we consider it necessary to declare:

- a) that the governments of the Baltic states have never demanded and will not in the future demand any transfer of nuclear weapons to the jurisdiction of the republics;
- b) that the governments of the Baltic states intend to pursue a policy of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nonnuclear zones, and that they are prepared to participate in international cooperation in this sphere;
- c) that we are convinced that the emergence of our nonmilitarized neutral states will in the future become a new factor of international security;
- d) that we welcome prospects for the beginning of new negotiations between the Soviet Union and United States on the reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

We express the hope that governments and peoples will share our anxiety regarding the danger to freedom and democracy that arises when the nuclear weapons factor becomes a means of exerting political pressure.

This declaration will remain open for signature on the part of governments of other states and other republics of the USSR.

[Signed] **I. Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Latvian Republic.**

K. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic.

E. Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Republic Government.

[Dated] Tallinn, 8 December 1990

Obminskiy on Size of 'Peace Dividend'

91UF0312A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 1, Jan 91 pp 18-19

[Article by E.Ye. Obminskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs: "The Peace Dividend"]

[Text] *A great deal was said last year about the "peace dividend" of the new political thinking, about the growing economization of Soviet foreign policy. What specifically has been and is being done here? E.Ye. Obminskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, talks about this at the request of EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN.*

No explanation is needed of the fact that the goal of the foreign policy activity of our state is the creation of favorable external conditions for the country's normal socioeconomic development, provision for its national security, and satisfaction of its state interests taking into account the present stage of development of our society, when the main threat to its existence is seen primarily in our internal problems.

Previously it was simply impossible to discuss the problem of the "economic cost" of USSR foreign policy decisions by virtue of the "specificity" of this sphere of state activity. Ideologization of interstate relations enabled us to explain any foreign policy collapses and failures through the destructive and confrontational approach of the other side.

Today the situation has changed. Assessments have begun appearing ever more frequently in our press with respect to the economic consequences of one or another foreign policy action of the Soviet Union. Here, as a rule, we see a comparison of factual expenditures in implementing a specific foreign policy measure with expenses for it as determined on the basis of the "reasonable sufficiency" principle.

Initial investigative studies in this sphere, which have yielded only the most general outlines of the order of magnitude of the figures, show that the old confrontational thinking simply exhausted the country's economy. Involvement in regional conflicts alone over the past 20 years has cost our people hundreds of billions of rubles [R].

Only now are we seeing the first fruits of the "peace dividend." According to available data, measures undertaken on the basis of the new political thinking to defuse regional conflicts, withdraw Soviet forces from foreign territory, and reduce foreign aid granted on an ideological basis have enabled us to effect a savings of approximately R16 billion during the period 1988-1990 alone.

The process of peaceful transformation provides justification to believe there will be a continuation of policy directed towards a decreased military budget, reduction of our military presence in the countries of Eastern Europe, rejection of the country's participation in international conflicts abroad, and establishment by the USSR Supreme Soviet of realistic limits on aid provided

to foreign states. If all of this is observed, the total savings prior to 1995 could exceed R200 billion.

However, the "peace dividend" of the new political thinking is far from being limited to this.

With proper formulation of the matter, a tangible economic effect might be achieved through the efforts being carried out in the country to convert military production, the result of major international agreements in the disarmament sphere. In accordance with the all-Union conversion program, this process presently encompasses over 500 enterprises, of which 40 should be converted in their entirety to peaceful ends.

Experts calculate that in 1991, with continuation of the disarmament process, the military production output volume by enterprises of the defense complex will decrease by 14 percent as compared with 1988, while their civilian production output for the same period will increase by 30 percent. Here the percentage of "peaceful" production will have increased from 43 to 53 percent. By 1995 the output of nonfood products alone in the system of the military-industrial complex may exceed R70 billion.

World history shows that the refitting of military to civilian production will be fraught with significant difficulties and financial losses—in 1990 alone we were required to allot at least R350 million for this purpose. The directive imposition on a number of defense enterprises of orders based on a non-intrinsic production line often results in their receiving lower revenues, a drop in workers' salaries, and the departure of some skilled cadre from the facilities undergoing conversion. The organizational restructuring related to conversion has required major capital investments which the enterprises have not been able to effect.

The first lessons of conversion put us on warning. The military sectors comprise a weighty segment of our national wealth, and thoughtless manipulation of them would inflict damage very difficult to correct. A full-fledged utilization of the scientific-technological and intellectual potential of these sectors during their transition to civilian production is a necessary condition for effective accomplishment of real disarmament and conversion. The adoption of a law on conversion would help in this process. It would not just enable regulation of the mechanism for demilitarization of the economy, but would also confirm the seriousness of our intentions to materialize a lessening of world tension and to effect transition from an economy of arming to an economy of disarming.

We should also stop to consider another aspect of the "peace dividend"—the readiness of the West to provide consultative technological and financial-economic assistance to the conduct of reforms in our country. This would hardly have been possible just a few years ago. Today the process gathering strength in the world of overcoming bloc-oriented thinking, a thinking that divides countries into "ours" and "theirs," has brought

about a situation in which the old motto of political gamesmanship—"the weakening of theirs is the strengthening of ours"—has already lost its general application. No matter how one views foreign loans and credits (in the past year alone the Soviet Union was extended credits totalling about \$20 billion), there can be no doubt that, until quite recently, discussion of such amounts would not even have taken place.

It should be stipulated right away that, with all the weight of urgent economic problems and deepening crisis, our interest as recipients of Western economic assistance consists not in obtaining temporary relief by eating up additional imports, but rather in using the aid as an effective lever for effecting deep transformation of the economy. Foreign assistance can become such a lever only when it is skillfully applied, when it is organically structured into the overall program of transformation. Otherwise it will only "drive the sickness deep inside."

Of course, a new line of foreign policy might yield far more tangible results were it not for the emergency, critical situation we presently see in the Soviet economy.

Under these conditions, our country finds itself in a precarious situation. On the one hand, massive sympathy abroad for the processes of perestroika and democratization in the USSR has prolonged such forms of assistance as humanitarian aid in food and medicine. On the other hand, reaction in our country to this aid is quite mixed, even in spite of such calamities truly global in scope as the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the earthquake in Armenia, and others.

To this point over 30 countries have declared their intention to provide us humanitarian assistance and in fact are already doing so. On the whole, according to the most modest estimates, the total volume of such assistance provided us up until now by foreign states has reached an amount equivalent to \$2 billion.

It is well known what tremendous expense and difficulties the creation of an open, market economy in the USSR has imposed upon us. At the same time, the world has accumulated a richness of experience in the regulation of economic processes (to include under crisis economy conditions), the struggle against unemployment and inflation, optimization of investment programs, improvement of finances, development of the export sector, effecting convertibility of national currency, and de-state-ization and demonopolization of economic structures.

International economic organizations remain the unique "reservoir" of such experience. The course we have undertaken toward deepening cooperation with them is capable of providing a weighty economic effect.

Significant progress has been achieved in this sphere in recent years. Contacts have been established and are being developed with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which have as their goal our phased entry into their structures. Our request to be granted

observer status at the GATT has been approved. The USSR is one of the founders of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Dialogue is developing with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

All of this may have far-reaching positive consequences for the integration of our country into existing world economic structures. However, the fact itself of political breakthrough in our relations with these organizations still does not entail a commensurate return. Such a return can grow only to the extent we have growth in the scope of our concrete everyday efforts.

Soviet Role in Iraqi Scud Acquisition Viewed

LD2601211591

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 26 January, in its "Vremya" newscast, carries a three-minute in-studio interview with Vladimir Mikhaylovich Mikhalkin, chief of the Soviet Ground Forces' missile troops and artillery. The interview follows reports on the Gulf war and the recent increasing emphasis on the fact that Scud missiles are "Soviet made." The presenter says: "An ambiguous situation is taking shape. The inexperienced viewer might think that the Soviet Union is continuing to deliver missile technology to Iraq even now." He then introduces Vladimir Mikhaylovich Mikhalkin.

Mikhalkin explains to viewers what a Scud is. He tells them that it first became part of armaments of Soviet troops at the beginning of the 1960's. "Since then, the missile has not undergone any modernization." He says that they did sell the missiles to Iraq, and that Iraq, with the assistance of the FRG and Italian firms, updated the missile and increased its range from 650 to 900 km, giving it different names. He says: "It is a fundamentally new missile. The attempts of Western news agencies to accuse us of something do not, of course, stand up."

In reply to the question of when the deliveries of missiles to Iraq by the Soviet Union ended, Mikhalkin says: "That was in the 1970's."

Asked to assess the general situation in the Gulf, Mikhalkin says: "In assessing the general situation regarding the application of missile troops in this war, one should say that, as a result of mass application of missiles, of any complex of missiles, the sides can naturally suffer great losses. They are particularly dangerous for the population."

Asked whether Iraq's missile potential has been exhausted, Mikhalkin says: "I think that it has not been exhausted. They still possess the necessary quantity of missiles to carry out military operations."

He concludes the interview by agreeing with the presenter that the further course of the Gulf war is obviously unpredictable.

START TALKS

General Staff's Kuklev Expects START To Be 'Ready on Time'

*LD2301204191 Moscow World Service in English
1810 GMT 23 Jan 91*

[Text] Soviet-American talks are under way in Washington to put the final touch to the agreement on reducing strategic offensive weapons [START]. The treaty is to be signed at the Moscow summit which is planned to be held from 11-13 next month. Here is what a military observer of Radio Moscow, Colonel Vadim Solovyev, says:

The two sides have agreed that the number of nuclear warheads would not exceed 6,000 and the number of delivery vehicles no more than 1,600 and that includes intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic aviation and strategic naval units. Along with the signing of the agreement on strategic offensive weapons it is planned to make a politically binding statement so as to keep the number of cruise missiles at a certain level. The Soviet Union pledges to reduce its heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles by half in the course of seven years and such a step, to my mind, is very indicative since the United States has no similar strategic weapons. In other words, the agreement on strategic offensive weapons would sharply reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust. But now when so little time is left until the planned meeting in Moscow certain experts express doubts over the treaty being ready. Some of them predict that it would not be signed. Here is the opinion of Major General Vladimir Kuklev of the General Staff of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces:

There is no reason to say that the treaty will not be ready on time, says Major General Vladimir Kuklev. Of course, there still are some unsettled problems, mainly technical ones, connected with certain aspects of control. The agreement provides for many on-the-spot inspections and even permanent inspections. This implies constant supervision over the production of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. There will be such supervision at two facilities in the Soviet Union, and at two in the United States. There is a principled agreement on that score. And now a common approach is to be worked out on less significant technical details. So, I'm quite sure that the agreement can be finalized on time. I've taken part in many different negotiations and can view the situation as a specialist. There are no questions that could be the cause for torpedoing the agreement. Such is the opinion of Major General Vladimir Kuklev of the Soviet Union's General Staff.

Baker Cited on Summit Postponement, START Progress

*LD2901101591 Moscow TASS in English 0906 GMT
29 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondents Aleksey Berezhkov, Stanislav Lunev, and Vladimir Matyash]

[Excerpt] Washington, January 29 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Monday held a news conference following their meeting with President George Bush.

Baker noted that the sides discussed Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations, work on the START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaty, the Gulf crisis and situation in the Soviet Union.

Asked if the fact that the summit will be rescheduled reflected the U.S. belief that the Gulf war will be over in a matter of weeks rather than months, Baker answered in the negative. But he made it clear that "if the Gulf war is still continuing then, I suppose we would have to look at the situation at the time".

Speaking about work on the START treaty, Baker noted that "there are a few problems, some of which are of a technical nature". "The Soviet minister and the president just agreed that we would continue to try and conclude the strategic arms treaty if possible during the months of February. We will continue to work as hard as we can to conclude it," Baker said.

Baker said the position of the two governments is "to go forward with the strategic nuclear arms treaty as rapidly as possible, keeping in mind that this treaty has been eight years in the negotiation, and we are getting down to the very end of the line here".

"The two countries spent quite a bit of time negotiating when the relationship between the two countries was far less good than it is today," he said.

"I think it is obvious that President Gorbachev is wrestling with a number of problems, but that's nothing new. He's had these problems in the past, and he is coping with them to the best of his ability," Baker said.

"The question of the Baltics was discussed at quite some length. It has been discussed by the minister and myself over five hours. It was discussed here by the minister and the president during the course of their meeting. We have made our substantial concerns known to the Soviet Union in a substantial way," Baker said.

Asked to comment on his meeting with President Bush, Bessmertnykh said they "had a very substantive discussion that dealt with the prospects and the basic, the fundamentals of Soviet-U.S. relations", the Baltics and arms control.

Asked if the Soviet Union was disappointed with the postponement of the Soviet-U.S. summit, Bessmertnykh said it was not. [passage omitted]

Bessmertnykh Interviewed on Summit Postponement

LD2901205591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh by correspondent B. Kalyagin in Washington, D.C. on 29 January; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] It is understandable that a certain effect from the tragic events in the Persian Gulf was felt also in the course of the talks USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh held in Washington. Our correspondent B. Kalyagin reports:

[Kalyagin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh was received in the Oval Office of the White House by U.S. President George Bush. The Soviet minister handed the leader of the U.S. Administration a message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. A detailed conversation took place. Also taking part were U.S. Vice President Quayle and Secretary of State Baker. After the conversation, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and James Baker went out to the journalists who had assembled outside the White House. The ministers said that the presidents of the two countries, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush, had reached an accord that the Soviet-U.S. summit—initially scheduled for February—would take place later, in the course of the first half of 1991.

The USSR foreign minister granted an interview to Soviet television.

[Begin recording] [Bessmertnykh] Because the U.S. President is busy with the events in the Persian Gulf—as the commander in chief he cannot leave the U.S. capital while the conflict continues—and also because of the fact that the Strategic Offensive Armaments Treaty [START] is not yet ready, even though it must be said that probably over 98 percent of the treaty has been agreed—the sides have come to a unanimous mutual conclusion that the summit meeting can be postponed.

[Kalyagin] Has the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics exerted any influence on the decision to postpone the meeting?

[Bessmertnykh] The question of the Soviet Baltic republics was discussed between the two sides prior to my arrival in Washington, and during the meetings here it was touched upon by the U.S. side. We, so to speak, reacted to this in the appropriate way. The postponement of the summit meeting—its being put off until some later time—was brought about primarily by the two circumstances I mentioned.

[Kalyagin] Speaking of the remaining differences in preparing the Strategic Offensive Armaments Treaty, is the U.S. side not trying to make use of the complicated internal situation in the Soviet Union in order to get us to make unilateral concessions.

[Bessmertnykh] As you know, I did not get such an impression. I was in touch with them on this issue earlier, and Baker and I discussed this today, and this question was touched on with President Bush, too. You know the problems which remain—there are two, three problems—are of a very technical nature. They are very complicated. That is why it takes some time to complete them. I think that even here, in Washington, we will ensure a certain advance in resolving these problems. Moreover, it is a 500-page treaty, and even if we succeed, now, in solving all the main problems, even the technical work, right up to simply agreeing the wording of this treaty will take more time than we have left. So, today in his conversation with me, the President stated outright that the United States is interested in concluding this treaty on limiting strategic offensive armaments. We agreed that both sides would attempt to complete this treaty sometime in February.

[Kalyagin] How, as a whole, do you assess the present talks with the U.S. President, and with the secretary of state?

[Bessmertnykh] Well, frankly speaking, this was not my first meeting with the American leaders, but it was my first meeting in my new capacity. The talks were very intensive, very complicated on a number of aspects, but, at the same time, the level of mutual understanding and trust that has arisen between the Soviet Union and the United States has made it possible to discuss virtually everything in such a frank and businesslike form. We spoke about questions of security. We spoke about problems concerning the Persian Gulf, including prospects for the development of the situation there, not only around the Persian Gulf, but in the Near East as a whole. We spoke about questions of disarmament. I think that as a whole this was a stage of no small importance in the development of contacts between the two countries. [end recording]

Bessmertnykh 'Profoundly Satisfied' With START Progress

PM3001170991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[“Interview for PRAVDA” with USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh by TASS and PRAVDA correspondents V. Gan, V. Matyash in Washington; date not given: “A.A. Bessmertnykh: ‘Widening the Circle of Good-Neighborliness.’” For the full text of Bessmertnykh’s interview, see the FBIS Daily Report: SOVIET UNION for 31 January 1991, pages 1-3.]

[Excerpts] Washington—The major Soviet diplomat A.A. Bessmertnykh has become head of the USSR Foreign Ministry at a crucial period in international relations, as a new era of broad international cooperation and collaboration takes the place of the late and unlamented cold war. He is 57 years old, and he has devoted 34 of those years to the Soviet diplomatic service. He has come a long way—from ordinary Foreign Ministry

employee to head of the Soviet foreign policy department. At the end of his talks in Washington, he gave us his first interview.

[PRAVDA] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, you have succeeded to this post during an exceptionally crucial period. Could you share with us your view of the processes currently taking place in the world?

[Bessmertnykh] I think that in our foreign policy after the end of World War II much was predetermined by what I call the nuclear paradox. By that I mean that the traditional policy avenues were somewhat distorted by the demands of ensuring security in light of the nuclear factor. That is why such enormous attention was devoted to relations with countries possessing nuclear arsenals. All this was absolutely necessary, but at the same time, in my view, the traditional relations with our neighbors were to some extent pushed into the background. I think that now that we have entered a new stage, the stage of arms reduction, the strategic balance of forces, and parity, it is necessary—without belittling the significance of our relations with the United States and the other great powers—to devote greater attention to countries directly adjacent to our state. [passage omitted]

It is sometimes asserted that our actions in the field of disarmament have weakened us. That, of course, is a surprisingly unprofessional view, although it sometimes issues from very professional circles. After all, when we are seeking to eliminate military-political confrontation that is the most important factor for safeguarding security. What point is there in stockpiling as many weapons as possible and only making enemies? I believe that this option is absolutely unacceptable and extremely dangerous. When we stop holding Pershing missiles to a country’s head, when the most inveterate foes first become opponents and then neutral, and after that perhaps even partners—that evolution in my view is a very useful business. [passage omitted]

[PRAVDA] During the talks with the American side you discussed questions on the finalization of the strategic offensive arms limitation treaty [START]. It is reported that both sides are virtually in despair because of lack of progress. What, nevertheless, were the results of the discussion?

[Bessmertnykh] There was no despair. On the contrary, I am profoundly satisfied with the way everything has turned out. It is better to take the step of postponing the summit than to make a mess of such a major measure. The circumstances clearly make it necessary—the conflict in the Persian Gulf, the need to do more work on the START treaty. Incidentally, I want to make the point that when we—both sides—declared that additional work was needed on the treaty, this should in no way have been interpreted as a sign of any crisis in our efforts to complete it. We have just a few unresolved questions left. It is simply that, when we counted the days we had left until the Moscow meeting and then looked at the vast bulk of the treaty remaining to be finalized textually

and amended in detail it became clear that, although we could indeed resolve the problems, there was not time to do so before the start of the summit. Looking at it practically, we are in a position to complete work on the treaty in the next two-to-three weeks. In other words, we have made progress, and the delays are due to purely technical causes. There is no crisis. We are going to try to progress the matter further. [passage omitted]

Military Commentator Views START Treaty Issues

*LD0302142791 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 3 Feb 91*

[Statement by Radio Moscow military affairs observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev—recorded; Solovyev's comments are in Russian with superimposed translation into English]

[Text] According to our estimates, the treaty on strategic offensive arms [START] is ready by 98 percent. The issues of principle have been settled. Seven years after the treaty is signed the two sides will have much smaller potentials of strategic nuclear missiles, to be reduced by about one-third. The Soviet Union will have to cut back a larger amount of such armaments. Accordingly, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict will be reduced.

Now what will the delegations in Geneva be working on during the remaining time? What do the two percent of the issues' required accord yet stand for? [sentence as heard] Mainly, these are some aspects of verification of action on the future treaty. Besides using national technical means for the purpose, which was agreed upon earlier in the treaty to reduce medium and shorter-range missiles, the new treaty should provide for a great number of notifications, one-time inspections and inspections on a permanent basis. At the moment the related procedures are being coordinated in detail. For example, under the agreement the number of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles is not limited. Restrictions concern only the number of nuclear warheads for these missiles, 1,100 for each side. For this reason there should be special verification of their manufacture and storage.

There is an accord of principle that in the two arsenals each side will deploy permanent inspection posts. But how will these posts function? That is the question still being discussed. There is another verification method: getting telemetric data from aboard rockets. Roughly speaking the data are necessary to differentiate between combat launches of missiles and test and training launches. An accord has been reached to ban any actions that block getting such data, including coding the data and jamming. At the moment the two delegations are pondering on how to realize this provision in practice.

Also ahead is the final editing of the treaty text to rule out any possible inaccuracies. But the text is 500 pages long. At a meeting in Washington between the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and the

United States Secretary of State James Baker, confidence was voiced that the agreement may be ready for signing as early as this month. In the opinion of the Soviet military, this time is quite realistic.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Military Analyst Views Revised SDI Program

*LDO102195591 Moscow TASS in English 1922 GMT
1 Feb 91*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, February 1 (TASS)—President George Bush in his State of the Union address said he had issued instructions to have the SDI programme re-oriented so that it could ensure protection against limited nuclear strikes no matter what direction they may come from.

The new anti-missile defence concept, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, envisages the deployment of about 1,000 land-based and 1,000 space-based interceptor missiles. The previous, brilliant Pebbles programme envisaged the deployment of about 2,000 land-based and 4,612 space-based interceptor missiles.

The U.S. Administration is clearly reluctant to give up its Strategic Defence Initiative and is only willing to reduce its scale and cost step-by-step. This despite the fact that even the full-scale Star-Wars system, according to most experts, could hardly deter a massive nuclear strike. Many American specialists were openly doubtful about the space shield technical feasibility.

The Pentagon, of course, cannot ignore these arguments, but its utmost desire is to preserve the SDI programme. By changing the structure of a future anti-ballistic missile [ABM] system, the U.S. Defence Ministry seeks to make it more attractive for legislators and the general public. The same aim is served by plans to cut SDI spending. The updated variant of the global protection system is expected to cost an estimated \$30 billion instead of \$60 billion originally earmarked for the first phase of the original variant.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations is often named as one of the reasons behind the rejection of the full-scale SDI plan. This being so, the question immediately arises: Is the ABM system a necessity, even in its curtailed form? According to Henry Cooper, head of the SDI implementation organisation, this system can ensure protection against about 100 warheads. This is clearly insufficient to ward off or even to considerably decrease the effect of a massive strike. On the other hand, this cumbersome land- and space-based system is not needed to deflect missiles launched by misadventure or without sanction or to protect the country against a Saddam Husayn.

Is spending \$30 billion worthwhile in such a case? What political or military logic prompts such plans?

Now the final point. The creation of an anti-ballistic missile system, even in its curtailed form, is bound to undermine the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, which bans the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or their components.

In addition, according to this treaty and the protocol to it, the sides pledged to deploy land-based anti-missile systems within the boundaries of only one region. Is it wise, now that cooperative relations are taking shape between the Soviet Union and the United States, to discard the ABM Treaty which provides the basis for the process of strategic arms limitation and reduction?

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Batenin Views Future European Security Strategy

AU1601193691 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 9 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Major General Gelyi Batenin, military expert of the CPSU Central Committee: "Now Europe's Military Division Must Be Abolished, Too"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Consolidation Must Take Place Gradually

The changes that have happened in Europe were codified in international law in November 1990, when the "Paris Charter" and the "Joint Declaration of the 22 States" were signed in the French capital. (In this declaration members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact gave solemn assurances that they do not consider each other as opponents anymore—the editors) Now basic conclusions have to be drawn from this; a change is necessary.

Here there are some potential options. The first one: The blocs remain in existence, their strategies and military forces undergo a transformation; the goal is the dominance of a nonoffensive defense. The second variety: Via certain organizations or through mutual accessions, the blocs merge into a unified bloc of the European states (with the participation of the United States and Canada).

The third one: The blocs are liquidated after the military-political functions are passed on to the all-European parliament. The military infrastructure of the blocs is not abolished but is used as the basis for a cooperative system.

One also can put the above-mentioned options in chronological order. Then these would be stages of Europe's military-political consolidation. In any case, neither the first nor the second option can be considered as an ideal construction for all-European security—in contrast to the cooperative system, which would best correspond to the democratization of the relations of the participating states.

Sooner or later, however, stages one and two have to be gone through. But they still have a serious defect, namely

that they do not eliminate the basic situation—the search for a potential opponent. In the first option, this search would take place on the continent, in the second case outside Europe. This "search" lies in the nature of any bloc structure, as does the trend toward "excessive defense"—because every bloc is based on the egocentric goal of "better security" for the participants.

Options of the two-bloc and mono-bloc construction of security for Europe are conservative in their nature, because they always contain the element of political and military-strategic division into groups of states. In the first construction this dividing line will run through Europe and, as a result of Germany's unification and the weakness of the Warsaw Pact, it may shift toward the East. In the second case, the line will be located outside Europe, which, however, may give rise to absolutely justified security fears on the part of the remaining part of the world community. In other words, the preservation of the blocs (or one bloc) in Europe preserves principles of the cold war, namely those of deterrence and the "balance of fear."

In our view, the idea of a cooperative system of security, which FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has repeatedly mentioned, has good prospects for the future. What is the basis of this similarity of views? In particular the fact that cooperative security makes it possible to avoid the egocentric models of blocs. It makes it possible to create basically new, civilized, democratic mechanisms for controlling the military-strategic situation in Europe—and this on the basis of the balance of interests of all participants—mechanisms, which (in contrast to the blocs) leave every country with a completely free choice of means and ways for its own contribution to common security.

History Gives Europe One Decade

In this way, the collectively worked out European strategy of security will be implemented according to the following principle: Each participant is guaranteed the same security regardless of its military-political status and its rank. This means, like the share of every other participant, its share in security does not depend on the volume of its military contribution to common security. Each participant may make a contribution through political, economic, ecological, or humanitarian activities.

History gives Europe about one decade for creating the prototype of such a security system. During this period the democratic structures of economic and political power in the USSR and in the other East European countries must be stabilized. Essential geostrategic restructurings in the Third World, such as the elimination of explosive regional hotbeds of conflict, are indispensable. Much will also be determined by the end result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Legislator Views Withdrawals From East Europe

*PM2801120191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 5*

[“Conversation with L.V. Sharin, leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee,” conducted by S. Karkhanin, under the general headline “Logic of Forgetfulness”; place and date not given: “Those Who Are Selling Off the Barracks”]

[Text] The Soviet war memorial in Berlin's Treptow Park will probably be dismantled and returned to the USSR.... At the same time, the young men in soldier's uniform are already en route for home. What preparations are being made to greet them at their new posting, and what is the atmosphere like in the neighboring states where Soviet garrisons were previously stationed? To get the answer to this, representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee have visited the oblasts where the troops are to be stationed and the countries of East Europe. L.V. Sharin, who headed the deputies' group and is acting chairman of the committee, talks here about this:

“The first such trip took place back last summer, and instructions were issued to the Defense, Finance, and Foreign Economic Relations Ministries and transportation organizations on the basis of its findings. Incidentally, we did draw attention at the time to the fact that the troop withdrawal treaties are manifestly deficient: They do not require ratification in the Supreme Soviet and lack a range of additional agreements clarifying areas of contention. The committee adopted a resolution and has carefully followed the development of events. It has become clear that the problems regarding Army property left at places of former deployment are not being tackled in the best way. Poland has recently hiked its transportation rates, which are payable in convertible currency. It is demanding \$500 per combat vehicle and \$30,000 per train transiting its territory.

“After the unification of Germany we began receiving alarming letters that the Germans now treat our servicemen differently from before. Intolerance and various kinds of attacks are being increasingly encountered. There are cases of desertion from Soviet garrisons, and the Germans are not handing deserters over to the Soviet military authorities. This problem is not provided for in the treaties, and it too needs to be regulated. Other incidents are not uncommon: Our servicemen are arrested, hauled off to a police station, and subjected to lengthy interrogation allegedly on suspicion of some crime or other....

“When we set out on our trip in January we wanted to clarify the stance of the legislators of East European countries and inform them how we see the problems, since our servicemen enjoy different status in different countries. In Germany our troops, who entered there as victors, are regarded as occupiers. In Poland they are liberators. As far as Hungary is concerned, let us not

forget that it fought on Germany's side and that there was also 1956. You cannot disregard 1968 in Czechoslovakia either....

“First we traveled around those oblasts in our country where deputies had been before to see what work had been done. If you bear in mind how many difficulties there are in the country, a very great deal has been done. All the soldiers who have returned from abroad are living and working normally. There are training facilities, canteens, baths, and medical centers everywhere. There are also clear improvements regarding accommodation for officers and NCO's. In Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, where the local organs of power have helped, construction work is actively under way and there are almost no complaints.

“We are sometimes asked why the troops are being withdrawn specifically to those regions of the USSR. The answer is simple—the Army is stationed not where it is most convenient but where it is most needed under the new defense doctrine. We are completing the withdrawal of 123,000 men from Hungary and Czechoslovakia—a huge operation. In carrying it out the ‘small, everyday things’ which in many respects determine people's frame of mind must not be neglected, however.

“Incidentally, people's deputies of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Uzbekistan were part of our delegation and they have also carried out a lot of work.

“In Poland we met with deputies of the Sejm and representatives of ministries and visited Soviet garrisons. Our talks were complex. We expressed our dismay at cases of Polish authorities' delaying Soviet military trains. How is the following to be regarded: Our garrison handed over a military camp to the local authorities, but people are now removing it piecemeal, taking advantage of the small number of guards. This property should be sold, but the Polish side is already beginning to sell it off, alleging environmental damage caused by our troops.... It transpires that the USSR will not only have to hand over the remaining military property to the Poles free of charge but also pay a sizable sum on top.

“V.P. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces in Poland and authorized representative of the Soviet Government in respect of Soviet troops in Poland, has issued a statement in this regard in which he gave an assessment of the Polish side's proposed new draft protocol on regulating legal, property, and financial questions.

“In our arguments with Polish representatives we made it known that delaying the withdrawal of our military units from Germany is not in the interests of the Poles themselves and that the way the USSR Supreme Soviet regards the treaty with Poland and the prospects for relations between our countries will depend to a large extent upon their stance. It was decided to continue consultations.

"In Hungary, where the withdrawal of troops is coming to an end, we also had to contend with problems which were again mainly property-related. Housing and hospitals constructed for the Soviet military are now being left for the Hungarians. The Hungarians are in no hurry to make payments and are putting forward counterclaims, however. I think their plan is to wait until the last Soviet soldier has left and then grab it all for free. Which means that the International Bank for Economic Cooperation and the Gosnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] must act more intensively."

"Hungarian legislators are adopting a very rigid stance, although they do acknowledge that the withdrawal of troops is taking place in a well-organized and efficient way."

"In Czechoslovakia we conversed with Alexander Dubcek, who said, turning to his colleagues: 'Do not forget that the Soviet Union needs us less than we need it.' Many people are now giving consideration to how partnership ties between the USSR and the countries of East Europe will develop. So is it necessary for our neighbors to try to derive benefit by 'selling off' Army property, thereby jeopardizing good relations with the Soviet Union? Nevertheless there is no letup in attempts to reduce this to a 'zero option' whereby no one owes anyone anything."

"We had many conversations in Germany, including in Bonn. We reminded people that our troops are in the country not as 'guests' but as victors. It is for Germany to solve the problem of transit through Poland. The billion marks [DM] allocated by the Germans are not enough, in the Poles' opinion, and if the treaty is aborted, it will not be our fault. Moreover, if we have to withdraw 533,000 men, facilities have to be provided for them. The Germans are to construct military townships in the USSR costing DM7.8 billion, but things have not yet gone beyond talking."

"The general conclusions are as follows: Treaties are concluded at a state level, while the military department alone has to bear the responsibility and solve all the problems. Commerce and the environment have need of specialists here. It is certainly necessary to set up a permanent group of specialists in Poland and Germany capable of providing skilled, prompt assistance in troop withdrawal. One more thing. Britain has concluded with Germany a treaty for the withdrawal of just one division. The document stipulates two years for preparation and four years for withdrawal.... Of course, the political situation surrounding our troops in East Europe is different. But it would nevertheless be worth providing a longer timetable for our garrisons, too. We must not conclude treaties detrimental to our interests."

"We also intend to propose that an interparliamentary observer group be set up which will be able to monitor how the withdrawal of troops is progressing. Governments are not always able to do what legislators can."

"And finally, we fully share our officers' ideas and feelings that it is essential to return home with our heads held high in pride, with combat banners unfurled, and with honor and dignity. Our Army has earned the right to respect."

NGF Commander Speaks on Pullout From Poland

*PM2801152791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 5*

[Statement by Colonel General V.P. Dubynin, Soviet Government representative for the presence of Soviet troops in the Polish Republic and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, under the general headline "Logic of Forgetfulness;" first paragraph is editorial introduction: "I Am Ashamed Before Those Who Perished"]

[Text] Statement by Colonel General V.P. Dubynin, Soviet Government representative for the presence of Soviet forces in the Polish Republic and commander of the Northern Group of Forces [NGF], made to the Polish delegation at the Soviet-Polish talks on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory in Moscow 10 January 1991.

Esteemed Director of a department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, esteemed members of the delegation!

As a member of the Soviet delegation, representative of the Soviet Government for the presence of Soviet forces in Poland, and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, I am obliged to make a statement to the Polish delegation and the mass media.

The Polish Government made a proposal to the Soviet Union concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory. In response to this our government started talks based on goodwill and respect for the sovereignty of the Polish Republic, and today we are participating in their third round.

During the second round of talks in Warsaw, the basic articles of a treaty between the Governments of the USSR and the Polish Republic on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory were discussed.

The contracting parties agreed with article 3 of the treaty, which states that until the Soviet forces are fully withdrawn from the territory of the Polish Republic, the provision of the Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and the Polish Republic on the Legal Status of Soviet Forces Temporarily Stationed in Poland dated 17 December 1956, together with the supplementary agreements and protocols in force, will be in effect.

Before the third round of talks in Moscow, the Polish side proposed a new draft protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Contrary to all logic, new conditions for the presence of Soviet forces on Polish territory have been included in it along with other questions....

We are discussing a troop withdrawal treaty, so why have conditions for the continued presence of the Northern Group of Forces in Poland been included? We have a joint agreement dated 18 June 1958 on the procedure for and terms of use by the Soviet forces temporarily stationed in Poland of various types of installations and services, and protocols dated 28 December 1963 and 2 August 1975. Therefore I see no need for further discussion of any terms or the signing of a new document.

I believe that the Polish side did this with the following aims:

- first—to drag out the talks and sidetrack the Soviet delegation;
- second, and most important—to obtain the greatest possible profit at the expense of the Soviet people, in violation of international laws, and in complete contempt for the sovereignty of Soviet citizens in Poland.

In the new draft protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet forces the Polish side is trying to represent the servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces as occupiers and international criminals and proposes that they be removed from its territory like prisoners of war, in railroad trucks locked and sealed by Polish customs, and without personal weapons or combat equipment. To remove ignominiously and in disgrace the forces that in 1944-1945 liberated the Polish people from the brown plague and the fascist occupation and gave East Pomerania, Prussia, and Silesia to the Poles in perpetuity and established the western Polish border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers. I recall that over 640,000 Soviet soldiers perished for the freedom and independence of Poland. Another 1.1 million of our compatriates were killed in concentration camps....

Neither individually or collectively did any of them contemplate any kind of future compensation. Indeed, what compensation could there be for the most valuable thing a person possesses—life?

But since the Polish side, on its own initiative, is rejecting norms that are accepted in the civilized world, the following reciprocal question is legitimate: Who will pay us for the losses of human life involved in the liberation of Poland, and in saving Krakow and other historical centers and values from destruction?

We have fulfilled an international duty in Poland for over 45 years. During this whole time we ensured peace in your land and, together with the Polish Army, prevented any possible aggression and provocation. Not only did our army protect and defend your country free of charge, it also paid and is continuing to pay for being here....

I am ashamed before my officers and men because of the humiliating conditions the Polish side is putting forward. I am ashamed before the older generation of Soviet people who liberated Poland. I am doubly ashamed before those who perished.

Nevertheless, the Polish side is continuing to insist on an examination of its version of a protocol whose aim is the enslavement of the Soviet Union. A protocol that envisages millions [currency not specified] in contributions for every Soviet soldier who returns home. As a member of the Soviet delegation I demand that the Polish side stop this humiliation of representatives of the Soviet Union. Who gave you the right to dictate humiliating and deliberately unacceptable conditions and mock a great power such as the Soviet Union?

I propose that a treaty on the transit of the Western Group of Forces across Polish territory be examined as a priority. If the Polish side does not agree with this—then I say we should hold talks on the transit problem between the USSR, the FRG, and the Polish Republic separately. But the Polish Republic must bear responsibility for the obstacles we are faced with in carrying out the Treaty on the Withdrawal of Soviet Forces From German Territory.

As I have understood from the course of the talks, the Polish side has not brought with it a package of proposals demonstrating goodwill toward the Soviet Union, or respect for the Soviet people, and it is adopting a stance of infringement of the rights of Soviet citizens carrying out their official duties on Polish territory. Therefore I propose:

1. That the draft protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions connected with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces (Polish version) is not discussed, but that only the Soviet draft is discussed. If the Polish side is not prepared to accept this, then the discussion should be postponed.

2. The withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces is a question for the future which is now at the discussion stage, whereas a treaty has already been concluded on the problem of the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from German territory. Hence the urgent need to discuss first and foremost the problem of the transit of Soviet forces and material resources across the territory of the Polish Republic.

In accordance with the aforementioned treaty the troops of the Western Group of Forces were to start returning home as of 1 January 1991, but the Polish side is blocking the movement of the troop trains. Discussion of the transit problem is a question of the utmost importance.

3. Speaking about the problem of the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces, we cannot fail to note the following: The Polish side is not leaving any hopes that an appropriate treaty will be concluded as quickly as the intergovernmental agreements on the Southern Group of

Forces and the Central Group of Forces. Or that the military townships will be vacated in a hurry. It is simply not prepared to accept (purchase) these latter, or the installations leased and built by the Soviet Union. We became convinced of this during the handover of installations in the town of Swidnica....

Thus, proceeding on the basis of the capabilities of the Polish side, it will need no less than 5-6 years to accept all the Soviet military townships and other installations. So is it worth hurrying events along and getting on each other's nerves?

As commander of the Northern Group of Forces I state with authority: We will return home—there is no alternative here. But we will leave with our heads held high, with unfurled military banners, with a feeling of satisfaction from the international duty we have fulfilled, and with dignity and honor. If the Polish side does not agree with the Soviet protocol on settling legal, property, and financial questions and does not display goodwill, then the Soviet forces will return to the territory of the great Soviet power in accordance with our plans and along the routes planned by us. In that event, however, we will bear all responsibility only for the life and health of Soviet people and we will shed responsibility for the Polish side.

In conclusion I want to stress that there can be no question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the Polish Republic until the full withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from German territory has been carried out.

Western Reactions to Troop Withdrawals Noted

PM2901103091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Jan 91 First Edition p 6

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov under the rubric "Authoritative Opinion": "European Itineraries"]

[Text] The events that have been taking place in recent months in Eastern Europe do not leave Soviet people indifferent. The editorial office mailbag bears witness to this. In many letters, such as that of M. Aushev from Saratov, there is an incipient anxiety about the possible consequences of the changes in the military and political landscape of the resurgent Europe. The accelerated timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the East European countries as well as the movements of other states' troop contingents which are planned or already being realized, give rise to no small amount of questions.

Redeployment. It looks like this will be for the coming few years the most widely used word when describing the actions of troops stationed in Europe. Troop trains from Hungary and Czechoslovakia are traveling east carrying home servicemen of the Southern and Central Groups of Soviet Forces. Our Western Group of Forces deployed in

Germany is beginning to move. Talks are proceeding on the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces from Poland.

Apart from the Soviet Army, the armies of other member states of the Warsaw Pact are also participating in the changes taking place at the moment on the European strategic map. Although it would probably be more correct to say those states that are still member states. For, after the well-known changes that have taken place in these countries, they are declaring with greater or lesser degrees of urgency their intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, or at least in the initial stages to eliminate its military structures.

Of course you can only welcome the elimination of the blocs and their replacement by new common European security structures. But the point is that there is no talk of eliminating the military structures of Europe's second military and political bloc—NATO.

Moreover, at the series of NATO conferences held last December, the need to maintain the bloc's military structures, equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons, was reaffirmed.

One of the pretexts to justify the need to maintain and develop NATO is the threat of instability in the Soviet Union. In the foreign mass media you hear the most diverse reports on the theme of the possible uncontrollable stream of refugees from the Soviet Union caused by the exacerbation of the food situation and the escalation of interethnic clashes in the republics. According to calculations cited, from 2.5 to 8 million Soviet refugees can be expected.

I personally am not very convinced by these calculations. I think that fears have been greatly exaggerated. But be that as it may, the East European countries' leaders, guided by such ideas, are planning, and in some places are even putting into effect, measures to limit this hypothetical stream of refugees from the USSR by the strengthening their border security. These actions also fit well with, say, the policy document "Armed Forces-90," recently approved by the Polish Government. In accordance with this concept, it is proposed to redeploy a part of the Polish Armed Forces from the western to the eastern border.

Of course, any state has the right to locate its Armed Forces on its territory in any way it sees fit. When I think about this redeployment, however, for some reason I recall U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney's recent visit to Poland, during which the possibility to "include the Republic of Poland in the international program of military and combat training, which the United States and other Western countries are implementing," was discussed among other things.

Taking into account the existence of similar processes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, I would risk suggesting that someone would like to erect in place of the collapsed Berlin Wall a new European wall—further east, closer to

the Soviet borders. Such an impression is only intensified by the never ending conversations centered around the possibilities of profiting from the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the East European countries.

The contours of our continent's new future were outlined at the meeting in Paris last fall of representatives of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is the documents adopted then which should guide the political and military redeployment taking place in Europe now.

CPSU Military Commission Discusses CFE Treaty

Moiseyev, Others Address Panel

PM0302151591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report by V. Izgarshev: "Concern for Military Is a Party Concern"]

[Text] A scheduled session of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Party Military Policy was held yesterday under the chairmanship of O. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Reports by A. Obukhov and M. Moiseyev, Communist leaders of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USSR Ministry of Defense, on the progress of arms reduction talks and safeguarding the military security of the Soviet state under the planned USSR Armed Forces reductions were heard and discussed.

Communists N. Shlyaga, B. Batalin, L. Nikiforov, O. Burdenko, and other commission members spoke in detail about the problems and tasks to be resolved by ministry and department party organizations in connection with the state's foreign policy activities, arms reductions, and agreements in this sphere. The speakers said that bilateral and multilateral treaties of importance for the destiny of the country and the whole world have been concluded recently. It is very important to ensure that the broad Soviet and world public, all the citizens of our country, have a clear idea about the objectives and progress of diplomatic talks and the nature of the documents adopted. It is also very important to ensure that everyone is aware of the military, political, and economic benefit of the agreements and treaties concluded. They are all intended reliably to ensure a peaceful life for the peoples of our country and to serve the cause of perestroika, the speeches emphasized.

The commission heard a report by Communist and USSR People's Deputy I. Gorelovskiy on a tour by representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee of a number of our military districts and East European countries in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. During an exchange of opinions the extraordinary importance of the party's concern for servicemen and members of their families was emphasized.

Doing everything to surround with warmth and attention the servicemen who have discharged their duty abroad selflessly and with honor and to provide their families with all the essentials—this is the No. 1 task of Communists in cities and army garrisons where units and subunits from the groups of forces are being redeployed.

At the conclusion of the session, Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, delivered a report on the military-political situation in the Persian Gulf.

Armed Forces' Newspaper Account

91WC0056A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian First Edition 5 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev: "From Moscow: The Negotiations and the Position of the Communists"]

[Text] On 1 February there was a regular session of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Party Military Policy. CPSU Central Committee Secretary O. Baklanov conducted the session. The participants in the meeting heard reports on the progress of the negotiating processes concerning arms cuts, presented by Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and A. Obukhov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs.

I. Gorelovskiy, deputy chief of a department under the USSR president, informed the participants in the meeting about the results of a trip by representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security to the military districts and East European countries in connection with the withdrawal of forces.

Speaking about the problems touched on at the session, members of the Central Committee Commission expressed several principled judgements, suggestions and critical remarks to those officials and specialists involved in the negotiating process from the Soviet side. In a resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Military Policy, it is noted that the participants in the meeting share the concern of the USSR people's deputies at the unsatisfactory provision for the social and material needs of the servicemen and their families who are arriving home from the groups of forces. The participants in the meeting also support the opinion of the USSR people's deputies about the severity of that problem and the inadequate character of the measures taken by the national and local governments.

Furthermore, in the adopted resolution they practically unanimously called for a more active participation by party members in making clear our country's position in questions of arms cuts. They supported the suggestion of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the expediency of working out a state program to carry out the withdrawal of forces from the East European countries.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the chief of the General Staff, at the request of CPSU Central Committee members, informed them about the situation in the Persian Gulf region.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakh President on Semipalatinsk Site

91WC0044A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 51, Dec 90 (signed to press 11 Dec 90) p 25

[Interview with Kazakh SSR President N. A. Nazarbayev conducted by OGONEK correspondent Yuri Lushin: "Goodbye, Test Site?"]

[Text] The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution to prohibit nuclear explosions and testing of all types of mass destruction weapons.

This action affects the test site in Semipalatinsk Oblast and other test sites on the republic's territory. Our own OGONEK correspondent, Yuriy LUSHIN, asked Kazakh SSR President N. A. NAZARBAYEV to comment on the new document.

[Correspondent] Why has this resolution appeared at this particular time?

[Nazarbayev] Everyone knows that nuclear tests have been conducted on the territory of Kazakhstan for over 40 years—at first in the atmosphere and on the ground, and then underground. All this was kept in strictest secrecy. No one was allowed near the test site, not even the republic leaders. It seemed to be a state within a state, with its own laws and regulations. The native inhabitants were deprived of the right to set foot on the land of their ancestors. Any protest could be viewed as an attack on the country's defense capability, as an attempt to weaken the Homeland's nuclear defense shield. Now, thank God, times have changed. However, the nuclear shield has become so heavy that making it any heavier would, in the appropriate expression of the poet Olzhas Suleymenov, threaten to crush the defenders themselves. The poet opposes the bomb. He heads the public movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk", which is fighting to ban nuclear testing throughout the world. After all, there are so many nuclear weapons stockpiled that they could destroy the entire planet full of people several times over. What is the sense of continuing the testing? I believe that Kazakhstan has fulfilled its duty to the country in full. And it has fulfilled it at a dear price—through the loss of health of tens of thousands of people, who are today annoyed by the assurances of the military that proximity to a nuclear test site is almost good for them. The patience of the people is not endless. It has come to a dangerous boundary. To pretend, as we did in the times of the administrative-command dictate, that all is well is simply immoral, and even criminal. It is not only the residents of Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, Karaganda, and East Kazakhstan oblasts of our republic who are speaking out in favor of stopping the nuclear

tests, but also the residents of adjoining oblasts in Russia. We have notified the leaders of the country and the military-industrial complex of the decisive attitudes of our people, but we have received no reply from them. That is when the republic's Supreme Soviet resolution appeared.

[Correspondent] The resolution also mentions other test sites. To what does it refer?

[Nazarbayev] Aside from nuclear tests, testing of various types of weapons is also conducted at other test sites on the republic's territory. These test sites take up millions of hectares of land. The population has been displaced from this area, the land was seized arbitrarily, and the people did not receive any compensation for it. We understand that the military departments work in the interests of the entire country, but the land and its nether regions belong to the peoples of the republic. This is also written in our declaration proclaiming the state sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR. Therefore, we demand that the questions of locating test sites be resolved by means of concluding agreements between the republic and the military departments. As it was, they did whatever they wanted, without asking anyone.

Or let us take, for example, the very same cosmodrome. As a result of the launches, the steppes of Dzhezkazgan Oblast are littered with spent rocket stages, pieces of them, and toxic fuel residues. Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research] has promised to decontaminate the land, but has done little. People ask me: Why is Baykonur closed to visits by republic residents, but open to foreigners? Why in all these years has there not been a single Kazakh cosmonaut trained here? I cannot answer these questions.

[Correspondent] How will control be implemented over the fulfillment of the resolution?

[Nazarbayev] That is a complex question. I hope that they will understand us correctly. However, if the military departments ignore the decisions of the republic's Supreme Soviet, then they will bear all the responsibility for this. In our opinion, there must be a changeover at the nuclear test site, so that its scientific base and highly skilled cadres are used only for peaceful purposes. President Gorbachev, Council of Ministers Chairman Ryzhkov, military-industrial complex Chief Belousov, and Minister of Defense Yazov have all long been aware of such a categorical formulation of the question. We have proclaimed the republic to be a sovereign state, which has the right to make independent crucial decisions. And if the military acts counter to the resolution, will this not mean that little has changed in the country, and that dictate and command from the center continues?

'Brief Existence' of Nuclear Test Site Reported

PM2401152591 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
23 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Oleg Stefashin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Unknown Nuclear Test Site"]

[Text] Shevchenko—A special commission of Mangistau Oblast Soviet Executive Committee has made a sensational announcement confirming the brief existence of yet another nuclear test site in the republic.

As one might expect, this had a bombshell effect in Kazakhstan. The population is alarmed and wants to know who decided to turn Mangyshlak into a dangerous nuclear-weapons testing zone which destroys all living things, and why. What secret experiments were carried out there and what might the ultimate consequences be? Unfortunately, official circles have so far remained absolutely silent.

It has been ascertained that secret operations to create a nuclear test site were actually carried out in the late sixties in the Ustyurt plateau, which is only 230 km from the city of Shevchenko. However, following three explosions at the depth of one km, the operation had to be suspended. The hypothesis is that this was due to local conditions, which turned out to be unsuitable for testing powerful weapons.

Having inspected the test site that is no more, the commission concluded that the background radiation in the locality was entirely safe. A higher level of radiation was recorded only in the vicinity of the casing of one of the shafts. It will soon be safely buried.

Certainly, the local commission failed to find answers to many of the questions that concern the population. In view of this, the Mangistau Oblast Soviet Executive Committee sent a note to the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry and the USSR Defense Ministry demanding the whole truth about the secret test site and the implementation of a range of extensive and meticulous checks at it.

Churkin on Comprehensive Test Ban, New York Conference

LD2601004791 Moscow TASS in English 1920 GMT
25 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow, January 25 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin, who spoke at a briefing here today, called the attention of journalists to the problem of a nuclear test ban and the Soviet Union's approach to it. He said that the Soviet Union is ready to announce a moratorium on nuclear tests "at any moment on the basis of reciprocity with the United States."

He stressed that this principled [word indistinct] has been set forth by the Soviet delegation at the conference on amendments to the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in three spheres, which ended in New York recently. Churkin specified that the conference had discussed the amendment extending the treaty to cover underground nuclear tests, which would make it universal.

Since it was clear from the very beginning that the United States and Britain, which are depositaries of the 1963 treaty together with the USSR, would veto the adoption of the amendment, it was not put to a vote, Churkin continued. The U.S. delegation also blocked the adoption by consensus of a final declaration of the conference. As a result of it, the conference decided by the majority of votes to grant authority to the chairman of the conference, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, to continue consultations with the aim to achieve progress in the banning of nuclear tests and in deciding where and when the conference could resume its work.

"Thus, the process started by the conference has actually been made continuous," Churkin pointed out.

The Soviet spokesman said that the USSR would take a most active part in the work, aimed at imposing as soon as possible a universal and complete nuclear test ban. He specified that the Soviet side would act both within the framework of the conference, and at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and bilateral Soviet-American talks on this issue.

Commentator Advocates Comprehensive Test Ban

LD2701123991 Moscow World Service in English
0000 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Valentin Zorin commentary]

[Text] As reports indicate, the first air raids carried out by U.S. pilots on Iraq were aimed at its nuclear installations. Now, as they claim, Iraq may not have nuclear weapons of its own for a long time. Then the world learned that the Israeli leadership was threatening to use this lethal weapon against Iraq; that was taken as a hint suggesting that Israel has nuclear weapons of its own. Quite a few indications appeared in the press earlier proving that this is so. In the light of this information the concern expressed by President Bush over the proliferation of nuclear technology is understandable.

It is not clear then why the Washington administration opposes measures that would prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons. What I have in mind is the administration's negative attitude toward a universal ban on nuclear testing. If an international agreement totally banning nuclear weapons became a reality none of the governments engaged in the development of nuclear weapons could succeed in that effort. In order to develop a nuclear bomb its testing is required. The present day technical facilities available in the United States, the Soviet Union, and some other countries, rule out any

possibility for holding such tests in secrecy. The logical question arises: Why does the U.S. Administration continue opposing a total ban on all nuclear tests? The Soviet Union for its part has expressed its readiness on many occasions to sign an agreement that would ban nuclear tests universally. What's more, for many months it had refrained unilaterally from holding such tests. Moscow expected Washington to follow suit. Then the moratorium on nuclear tests could be made permanent.

Today, as it seems, any references to tension and the Cold War made earlier by U.S. officials to justify their nuclear test policy are no longer relevant to the situation. The Cold War has receded in the past. Yet, the Americans go ahead with their nuclear tests. The Pentagon cannot say that more nuclear weapons should be added to U.S. nuclear arsenals. After all, they already contain over 20,000 charges. Any addition to them will hardly change anything. Obviously the U.S. Administration rejects the idea of a total ban on nuclear test just because it has no desire to enter into conflict with the right-wing circles unwilling to give up the stereotypes of the old political thinking. But the price of concessions to the extreme right elements in the nuclear weapons field may prove to be extremely high. Legitimate apprehensions have arisen today concerning the spread of nuclear technology in view of the events in the Gulf. But, tomorrow such apprehensions may appear, say, in South America, or South Asia.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Karpov ACDA Official on CW Inspection Trip

LD2601131891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1821 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 25 January (TASS)—Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, today received D. Mahley, deputy assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA], who is leading a U.S. delegation visiting one of the chemical weapons [CW] storage facilities in the USSR within the framework of implementation of the memorandum of understanding between the governments of the USSR and the United States with respect to the bilateral experiment on monitoring and exchanging information in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons.

During their conversation they had an exchange of views on key issues relating to Soviet-U.S. and multilateral talks on prohibiting chemical weapons.

USSR Said To Have Refused To Sell CW Warheads to Iraq

LD2801103891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 28 Jan 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney has said there is a real possibility that Iraq could use Scud missiles with

chemical warheads. True—in our opinion it is not certain whether Iraq has suitable warheads to deliver chemical weapons. We do know that not all that long ago Baghdad tried to buy these warheads from us, but it was met with refusal.

Iraqi CW, BW Capabilities, Risks Discussed

Chemical Troops Chief Comments

LD3001171191 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Network in Russian 1530 GMT 30 Jan 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In connection with reports in the media about the possible start of a chemical war [CW] in the Persian Gulf, requests are coming into Central Television from viewers for an explanation about the nature of a chemical war for the belligerents and for the population of our country. Our correspondent today met with Colonel General Petrov, chief of Chemical Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who answered his questions.

[Begin recording] [Sedov] This is my question, Stanislav Venyaminovich: Does Iraq have a military-chemical potential, and what kind of poisonous materials does its army possess?

[Petrov] It is not possible, of course, to give a simple answer to this question since the Soviet Union, and the Ministry of Defense in particular, has not exchanged information on such questions with Iraq and has not conducted cooperation in this field.

Here, for example, is a reference manual of the Institute of Problems of Defense and Analysis—the well known U.S. magazine CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS.

[Sedov] What does it say?

[Petrov] It cites data that Iraq is capable at the present moment of producing annually 1,000 tonnes of poisonous materials and from 250,000-500,000 different artillery shells. Saddam Husayn, the president of Iraq, has stated more than once that Iraq possesses chemical weapons and, moreover, ..

[Sedov, interrupting] And bacteriological weapons, too.

[Petrov] And bacteriological weapons, too, and moreover, he has also said that Iraq possesses the latest chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons.

[Sedov] Tell me, please, what kind of effect would the destruction of targets for the production and storage of chemical weapons on Iraqi territory or their use during combat operations have on the population of our southern republics?

[Petrov] The most complex situation could arise in the event of the destruction of stores with poisonous materials. In such an event a cloud of poisonous material could spread to a depth of several dozen kilometers, and naturally it constitutes the main danger to the population of Iraq itself. At the same time, war is war, as they say. Unforeseen things happen in wartime. For example, let us take a situation where, say, a plane carrying chemical ammunition from one place to another, as a result of being shelled, loses direction and heads in the direction of the Soviet Union. In this instance, of course, certain damage could be inflicted on the Soviet Union.

[Sedov] Well, as far as your specialists are concerned, are any preventive measures being taken in this connection at the moment?

[Petrov] In our southern regions there are chemical troops which are made up of special units and subunits of radiation and chemical warfare reconnaissance and airborne radiation and chemical warfare reconnaissance. These units are engaged in routine combat training, but they are geared toward being on the alert for possible unusual situations which could arise during the course of this war. [end recording]

Views Regional Dangers

PM2901155891 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
29 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops, by V. Litovkin; place and date not given: "Weapons That Have Not Yet Been Used"]

[Text] The air forces of the United States and its allies, news agencies report, are continuing their strikes against Iraqi chemical and bacteriological weapons storage bases, as well as the plants that produce these weapons. What kind of potential does Iraq have in such weapons, what kind of danger do they represent for the country itself, for the states bordering on the regions of hostilities, including the southern Soviet Union, and for the coalition troops?

Our correspondent's questions are answered by Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops.

[Petrov] You will understand that we cannot judge Iraq's chemical and bacteriological potential sufficiently accurately. There is too little information about this in the open press. I know the Americans also have no reliable data on this matter.

Nonetheless, according to specialists' information, Iraq's chemical weapons stocks could amount to between 2,000 and 4,000 tonnes of chemical agents. This is mainly mustard gas, prussic acid, tabun, and sarin. The country's leadership asserts that Iraq also has binary weapons, but nobody knows what type [markirovka] they are or what their components are.

There are reports that the development, production, and storage of chemical munitions took place at more than 10 to 12 facilities. Among these one can name, for instance, the chemical research center for the production and storage of chemical agents at Salman Pak southeast of Baghdad and Al-Kasha [as transliterated] not far from the northern Ar Rumaylah oil fields, facilities for storing these weapons in the Az Zubayr region, which is in the south of the country south of Basra, and also in the northwest, in the Samaria region and elsewhere.

This potential was created by Iraqi chemists themselves, they are very good specialists in this sphere, although there are reports that certain Western firms gave them assistance.

About Iraq's biological weapons [BW]: The same sources which I have already cited assert that the country has strains of anthrax and cholera and may possess exotic forms, unknown to everyone, of pathogens of fatal African diseases.

Nor can it be ruled out that Iraq has toxic weapons in the form of botulinum toxin, that is, the natural products of certain bacteria that are a terrible poison—the most powerful currently known to science. One hundred grams of this substance could kill hundreds of millions of human beings. If a strike is carried out against the sites where these weapons are stockpiled, the consequences could be totally unpredictable.

Iraq's stockpiles of bacteriological and toxic weapons are not known.

If chemical weapons—should their storage depots and facilities on Iraqi territory be destroyed—can hurt the country's civilians living in the vicinity of such facilities, the release of biological agents, under certain conditions, can pose a lethal threat to the population of neighboring countries, too. [Litovkin] Is there any information that facilities for the storage of chemical agents and bacteriological weapons have been hit?

[Petrov] Chemical agent and biological weapon storage facilities have been hit by aircraft and cruise missiles. It is known that they have destroyed nuclear reactors and chemical weapon development, production, and storage facilities. To be frank, experts consider that hitting targets of this kind is not the best way to prevent chemical and biological warfare.

All the indications are that the U.S. Air Force's efforts to destroy Iraq's chemical and biological potential have not been completely successful—strikes are continuing. Therefore it cannot be ruled out that as yet the probability of Iraq using these terrible lethal weapons remains.

[Litovkin] We sold Saudi Arabia 5 million gas masks. Has the USSR Defense Ministry given other countries of the region assistance in antichemical defense?

[Petrov] Nobody has asked us for such assistance. Naturally we are not giving it to anyone at this time.

[Litovkin] Are our southern republics threatened by a possible chemical and bacteriological danger from Iraq or areas of hostilities given that we are only some 250 kilometers away?

[Petrov] We are attentively monitoring events on Iraqi territory and also the situation in border areas. As yet there is no chemical danger to us.

As for the two Iraqi nuclear reactors, some Soviet experts claim that the reactors have not been destroyed, just damaged. The main point is that all these reactors had their core—that is, the nuclear fuel—removed back during the eight-year Iraq-Iran war. Even if they were completely destroyed there would be no significant contamination of the locality.

Medical Consequences Viewed

*PM2901191191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Jan 91 First Edition p 5*

[Interview with Colonel of the Medical Service N.Ye. Uskov, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate Sanitary and Epidemiological Department, and Honored Physician of the RSFSR, by A. Golts under the rubric "Specialist's Opinion"; place and date not given; "How Real Is the Bacteriological Threat?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The foreign press reports that a special briefing for Congressional leaders was held at the Pentagon. In the course of the briefing details were given, among other things, about the destruction of centers in Iraq where production of bacteriological weapons was being conducted during the international forces' air raids. What may be the consequences of the destruction of these centers? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Golts has put this question to Colonel of the Medical Service N.Ye. Uskov, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate Sanitary and Epidemiological Department, and Honored Physician of the RSFSR.

[Uskov] First of all I would like to emphasize that the use of bacteriological means in war at present, on the threshold of the 21st century, when most countries have signed the convention banning this barbaric weapon, would be a heinous crime for which there is no justification, nor can there be one. It must also be said that we do not have at our disposal any kind of official information to the effect that centers for the production of such weapons were located on Iraqi territory. It is true that foreign press articles speak of the production in Iraq of pathogenic organisms capable of causing terrible diseases like bubonic plague, malignant anthrax, tularaemia, and toxins causing botulism. I would like to draw your attention to the following circumstance here. If such centers did exist, and if they did contain certain quantities of bacterial cocktails, then the consequences should be evident by now, several days after the bombing: mass incidence of disease or epidemics among

servicemen and the civilian population in Iraq. To date, we have no such information. Consequently, the question arises whether these means were stored there when the bombing took place? After all, it would be entirely logical to assume that preparing for war and expecting such massive strikes, the Iraqi command could have shipped out these weapons and hidden them securely somewhere.

[Golts] As is known, Saddam Husayn stated recently that Iraq could resort to the use of mass destruction weapons in the war. What could be the consequences of the use of bacteriological weapons against the troops of the anti-Iraq coalition?

[Uskov] In any event the consequences would be extremely grave. After all, no matter how well the troops are protected, the specifics of bacteriological weapons are such that it is impossible to completely rule out contamination. A few grams of the botulism toxin contain millions of lethal doses. Certain types of pathogenic organisms, the spores of malignant anthrax for example, can survive for a relatively long time in the natural environment, retaining their morbific effect.

The casualties among the civilian population could be even more terrible. The use of bacteriological weapons in acts of terrorism cannot be ruled out. This could mean the contamination of water sources and the atmosphere at population centers. I would like to note that the quantities of crude oil that are currently being spilled into the Persian Gulf are threatening to disrupt the water supply in a number of countries. The lack of the necessary quantities of water could seriously complicate the implementation of anti-epidemic measures.

[Golts] Nikolay Yefremovich, could there be any kind of danger to our country if bacteriological weapons were to be used in the Persian Gulf area?

[Uskov] As for the possibility of air currents carrying bacterial means to the territory of our country, the likelihood of this happening is close to zero. The distance between the USSR's territory and the area of the conflict is so great that such cocktails would lose their dangerous concentration. Nonetheless, the Soviet Armed Forces' Medical Service, together with subunits of civil defense, is ready to carry out sanitary-prophylactic measures for the bacteriological protection of both the troops and the population.

UN Expert Interviewed

*PM3001184091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Jan 91 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with Professor Major General I.B. Yevstafyev, UN expert on investigating the circumstances of the use of chemical weapons, by correspondent A. Golts under the rubric: "Expert Opinion"; place and date not given: "Shadow of Chemical Weapons Over the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] The foreign mass media are reporting continuing air raids by the multinational forces on chemical weapons [CW] bases and dumps in Iraq. At the same time, S. Husayn has spoken directly of a possible strike using weapons of mass destruction. Does the possibility exist of the use of chemical weapons in this war? KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Golts put this question to Professor Major General I.B. Yevstafyev, UN expert on investigating the circumstances of the use of chemical weapons.

[Yevstafyev] It is rather hard to form an opinion on the possibilities of the use of a particular type of weapon on the basis of newspaper reports. But it can be said confidently that Iraq is among the countries capable—from the viewpoint of their level of scientific and technical development—of producing chemical weapons. By all appearances, a number of Western firms also helped it in this.

As for attacks on facilities for the manufacture and storage of chemical weapons, obviously these have not yet resulted in success for the anti-Iraq coalition. It may be assumed that the stocks of chemical agents are in specially hardened shelters at the facilities themselves, or else were transported elsewhere beforehand. It cannot be ruled out that Iraq simply does not have such weapons.

[Golts] All the same, Igor Borisovich, if you assume that Iraq does possess modern chemical agents, how effective, in your view, would their use in hostilities prove to be?

[Yevstafyev] We have examined the possibilities, working on the basis of the forces and resources that Iraq, according to information in the foreign press, possesses. I must say at once that the use of chemical weapons can produce a military effect only if they are used on a massive scale. Iraq does not have the resources necessary for that. So it is possible, by means of a strike against troops by isolated aircraft or small aviation elements, to hit an enemy battalion. Knowing the degree of protection of the U.S. troops and taking into account the American regulations, you can assume that losses in such a case would be no more than 10-15 percent of the servicemen. The effectiveness of cannon artillery, salvo fire systems, or even missiles would not be much greater. In the majority of cases it could be a question of a strike against company or platoon strongpoints.

[Golts] But is there a threat to civilians?

[Yevstafyev] Of course the civilian population is another matter, especially in cities. If a chemical strike is carried out against the civilian population the number of casualties will amount to hundreds or even thousands. In fact, this tragic account has already opened. Because even the chemical defense measures that have been implemented widely in Israel have damaged people's health, both psychologically and physically.

The use of chemical agents, especially against the civilian population, is without doubt a dreadful crime. But the blame, it seems to me, would not rest with Iraq alone.

[Golts] You mean that responsibility could be laid at the door of the United States and its allies?

[Yevstafyev] Precisely. I wish to stress once again that this is just my opinion, but it is the opinion of an expert. You see, if you analyze the different possibilities for the development of events, the conclusion that suggests itself is that the maximum contamination of the locality and human casualties would result from the destruction of chemical weapon manufacture and storage facilities. Yet the air raids on those facilities are continuing.

Whereas the choice of command and control centers, air defense systems, airfields, and missile bases as priority targets is understandable from a military viewpoint, the expediency of strikes against military chemical facilities is open to serious doubt. According to experts' assessments, the destruction by conventional munitions of chemical bomb stores containing 200-500 tonnes of sarin and tabun would result in casualties among the population at a distance of several tens of kilometers. In my view, the destruction of such facilities could be equated with chemical warfare. Does it really make any difference in principle whether civilian deaths are caused by stocks of chemical agents from a destroyed dump or by the use of chemical weapons by the attacking side? In practice a strike against military chemical facilities amounts to provocation of chemical warfare. This is a violation, if not in letter then in spirit, of the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in warfare. Could someone actually have an interest in Iraq's using these weapons?

[Golts] Igor Borisovich, does any danger exist to our country?

[Yevstafyev] There is no direct threat. Whatever scenario for the development of events you look at, the USSR's territory will not be affected. But what is happening in the Persian Gulf now prompts very serious reflections. The point is that accords have been reached between the USSR and the United States under which they exchanged data not only on their stocks of chemical weapons, but also on the places of manufacture and storage. Precise coordinates were supplied. Well, a secret that two people know is no longer a secret, as the saying goes. Yet the experience of the conflict in the Gulf shows that in the event of war these facilities will be first-strike targets. As a military man, I am obliged to think about this....

[Golts] But let us come back to the situation in the Gulf. There was a report in the newspapers that a substance has been invented in Sweden that neutralizes the effects of chemical agents and that it could be sent to the conflict region.

[Yevstafyev] Work on various types of antidotes to nerve gases, created on the basis of organophosphorous compounds, has been in progress for a long time in many countries. Quite good results have been achieved. It cannot be ruled out that Swedish scientists have progressed further than anyone else in this direction. But it should be borne in mind that the purpose of the antidote is to save individuals' lives. But it cannot totally neutralize the effects of the chemical agent.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Korean NFZ Urged To Solve 'Nuclear Safety' Issue

*SK0502033891 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 3 Feb 91*

[Commentary by station commentator (Girey Nihailov) from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] There was no concurrence for the nuclear safety issue to be discussed at the Pyongyang talks. According to Tokyo's allegations, the nuclear safety issue has been one of the factors that obstructs the normalization of relations between the DPRK and Japan. The basis of the issue is as follow: Pyongyang signed the nuclear non-proliferation agreement in 1985. The DPRK does not, however, allow on-the-spot inspections of the nuclear facilities by the delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Dealing with the issue carefully, some countries, including Japan, are suspicious of Korea that it may have initiated work of developing the nuclear weapons.

Saying that U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed in the south of the peninsula, Pyongyang has been adhering to its position. This is also grounds for argument. It is natural that the existence of the unsettled issue should break up the mutual confidence on the peninsula. The proposal put forward by Pyongyang for turning the

Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] is to solve the issue, which is being supported by many other countries, including the USSR, China, and countries that have nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union is willing to be cooperative in supporting the proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. In view of a concerned party's position, establishing a nuclear-free zone is an important factor to reduce confrontation and tension on the Korean peninsula. It will also be a positive process on the Korean peninsula.

I would say this given the relationship between the ROK and the USSR, and between the ROK and China, which are actively proceeding, and given the talks between the DPRK and Japan for the normalization of the bilateral relations, and given dialogue between the North and the South.

There was no contact between Pyongyang and Washington. The nuclear safety issue on the Korean peninsula is a difficult problem to solve. The U.S. and North Korean delegations held talks in Beijing, but this is not enough. Pyongyang suggests that it will expand contacts with the United States.

At the upcoming talks between the DPRK and Japan, the Korean side is going to ask Japan to mediate the talks between Pyongyang and Washington in solving the nuclear safety issue. The improvement of dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang will play a key role in solving other problems. Unexpectedly, the issue of Team Spirit joint military exercise, which have beeen conducted by the United States and the ROK for many years, will be coordinated.

Although Washington and Seoul try to scale down the size of the military exercise, the DPRK continues to regard it as an infringement on their country's security. In short, solving the difficult problems on the Korean peninsula depends greatly on the United States' attitude. Because of this, it is very important for Washington and Pyongyang to initiate dialogue.

BELGIUM

Commander Interviewed on FRG Withdrawal

91EN0211B Brussels *LE SOIR* in French 20 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Rene Haquin, special correspondent: "General Cauchie Describes Concerns"]

[Text] Weiden—"For me, the problem is simple: Nothing has changed since the Wall came down, except that we can no longer point our finger at the enemy or locate him geographically by reference to the Iron Curtain. But if we want to maintain a society where quality of life matters, then the Army must be ready to defend the country from any threat that presents itself. And the threat is there, so long as the Soviet Army—the biggest in Europe—is stationed in what was formerly East Germany. Its attitude could change from one day to the next under the pressure of events. In the Balkans and the Baltic countries, I see a dozen threats to stability. Borders are not well delineated, and there are conflictive situations similar to those that existed before 1914. Who knows whether someday the Belgian Army may get caught up in something? In the south, there are the Muslims and the fundamentalist movement. In the Gulf, I think Saddam Husayn will have to be dealt with sooner or later, if he continues his arms build-up..."

As decisionmakers in Brussels turned their attention to the important issues of Belgian troop withdrawal from Germany and a drastic reduction of the conscript force, General Robert Cauchie, the 58-year-old Brussels native who last year was named commander of Belgium's I Corps in Germany, displayed a certain amount of anxiety in the exclusive interview he gave us. German reunification and the sudden end of the Cold War have set in motion the disengagement of soldiers stationed in both eastern and western Germany. About 10 percent of the British troops, and 5 to 8 percent of the French, have already been transferred, and America's frightening binary chemical weapons have been removed to Bremen for eventual destruction on some Pacific islet. A few thousand of the 380,000 Soviet troops stationed in eastern Germany have been (timorously) repatriated. Some of the transfers of Belgian units called for in the first Charlier Plan have been carried out, others are still to come. But Charlier I has now been replaced by the Coeme Plan ("Charlier 2"), which will augment and accelerate the repatriations by a drastic reduction in the conscript force: only 3,500 troops will remain.

In Germany at present, in addition to 8,803 militiamen, we have some 13,761 career soldiers, close to 2,000 of whom are attached to the army's civilian component. Civilians number 21,633, counting the army's civilian component, spouses (8,558), children of all ages, some of whom are married and established there (11,025) and in-laws (109). Thus Belgians residing in our tenth province number 44,197.

Tomorrow Guy Coeme will submit the proposed schedule for further withdrawals (none are scheduled

before summer 1992) to the council of government. As yet, no concrete decisions have been made. At the approach of what many Belgians in Germany already fear will be a calamity, our tenth province is a hotbed of rumor, speculation, uncertainty and pessimism. When will it happen? Who will be affected? Where will they go?

Three Decades

"Our soldiers are peace-loving. Some of those who have lived here for 10, 20, or 30 years would prefer to be left in peace in Germany. They are afraid of change. Some are strangers to Belgium. Many of the noncommissioned officers who form the backbone of the units don't want to return. For many of them it will be a journey into the unknown. Already exploited in the past, the temporary cadres face an additional uncertainty: Worry about being taken for granted. And all of them face prospective loss of the benefits (admittedly less than fantastic) that compensated them for being stationed far from home, for the uprooting of their children, the insecurity suffered by wives, the loss in some cases of careers already established here, the ordeals here and there of widows and divorcees. In January a broad survey will be taken to ascertain their preferences.

"German reactions to the departure depend on the problems they themselves are facing. Local governments in the area must assimilate refugees: the abandoned garrisons are thus a windfall. For others, like the merchants of Soest whose livelihood depends on the Belgians, replacement of the latter by refugees with their meager purchasing power will come as a hard blow. While environmental activists will be happy to see us leave their green fields, that view is not shared by the foresters, who appreciate our respect for nature and fear that tourists will not treat it as considerately. In the Weser region, our combat training zone, we have cleaned up virtually all the damage caused by our maneuvers, and until five years ago—as long as the threat remained real—the Germans were very supportive. Now perhaps they are somewhat swept up in a feeling of liberation. But most officials at both the Lander and federal level, and a majority of the German Army, remain favorably disposed to the presence of other nations in Germany. They understand the danger posed by an excessively strong Germany."

Gen. Cauchie estimates it will take three years to build the infrastructure necessary to complete the transfers of units back to Belgium and the shift of active units to reserve status. The restructuring and the gradual reduction of time in military service will require—absent a political decision to make service mandatory for all youths, females included—an increase in the number of volunteers, if units are to remain operational. There may be problems with the military hospital in Cologne that merit investigation, but the fact is an army must have a medical center and adequate health care facilities. Belgian teachers in Germany, anxious about their ability to find new positions when they return to Belgium, are also

needed to fulfill our obligations to the Belgian children in Germany, as long as they remain there.

"Our army is enthusiastic and has a healthy attitude," concludes Gen. Cauchie. "The desertion rate is small (35 soldiers in the regular army and 161 militiamen were convicted in 1989). There has been a considerable reduction in the use of tobacco, alcohol (Dutch-speaking Belgian soldiers in Germany consume on average 1.3 tankards of beer per day, compared to 0.27 for their French-speaking counterparts and 0.7 for the Belgian population as a whole). Drug use is not widespread (1.1 percent among the Dutch-speakers, 3.7 percent among the francophone group, where there have been problems with some of the militiamen). But the future of the army is uncertain: lack of recruitment incentives, poor salaries, lack of solid information about the restructuring. Many soldiers are tempted to leave and take their chances in civilian life, where some can earn twice as much..."

A realistic look at a complex problem and the unpredictable future—for which policies here are already beginning to lay the groundwork.

Expert Says Iraq Ready To Unleash Germ Warfare

AU2901163291 Paris AFP in English 1616 GMT
29 Jan 91

[Text] Brussels, January 29 (AFP)—Iraq is probably ready to unleash germ warfare when a ground war begins in the Gulf, Belgian toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx warned here Tuesday.

Mr. Heyndrickx, head of toxicology at Ghent University, said Iraq was known to have used typhoid and cholera germs against its minority Kurds in 1988.

"We know that from members of Medecins du Monde who worked on the Turkish border," Mr. Heyndrickx said, referring to a humanitarian body.

"The Turks kept it quiet, because they were friends with (Iraqi President) Saddam Husayn at the time. The victims were cared for secretly in Turkey," he said, adding that Iraq had blocked all attempts to investigate.

Mr. Heyndrickx went to Iran in the mid-1980's to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in its war against Iran. He was there again just before the war broke out "at the request of a government in the region" to advise on decontamination and treatment, he said.

The Iraqis might now be ready to use anthrax and botulism germs, and would certainly use chemical weapons, he added.

There is disagreement here over the danger posed by chemical warfare. Mr. Heyndrickx said: "We saw it in Iran. He (Mr. Husayn) attacked 2,000 villages. He won the war against Iran thanks to chemical weapons."

But Andre Dumoulin, of the private research organisation GRIP, [expansion unknown] said an Iraqi chemical attack would have no military effect. He said Iraq lacked the technology to put a chemical charge on a missile while its air force lacked the strength to deliver chemical bombs.

Mr. Dumoulin said an area subject to a chemical attack would be easily sealed off even if highly dangerous toxic liquids were used, and that such an attack could be significant only if delivered through saturation bombing.

"I cannot see the Iraqi air force delivering such an attack. It would have to be done at night to avoid early detection. Iraqi pilots are not used to night flying and are not equipped for it," he said.

But Mr. Heyndrickx said he and colleagues had personally counted thousands of dead victims of chemical warfare in Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan. Towards the end of its war with Iran, Iraq had replaced its mix of "yellow rain" mycotoxin, mustard gas and a neurotoxin by a cyanide-based gas because it killed quicker, he said.

The Iraqis had since improved their chemical weapons. "They cause incontinence, paralysis, blindness. It is incurable. Mothers do not recognise their children. The victims become living vegetables," he said.

FRANCE

Potential of Iraqi CBW, Nuclear Arms Evaluated

91P20112A Paris L'EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL
in French 18 Jan 91 p 13

[Article by Elie Marcuse: "Iraq's Dirty Weapons"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] There are three possible actions in Iraq's battle strategy which are considered particularly "terrifying."

1. The utilization of chemical and bacteriological weapons [CBW]. Iraqi technicians are now competent with this type of weapon. Saddam Husayn proved this to the Americans by the intermediary of Western visitors to Baghdad, the German Willy Brandt and the Japanese Yasuhiro Nakasone. His industry can now dissociate the toxic elements released by the ballistic missile explosion. This is the "binary" system which up to now only the major powers had possessed. [passage omitted]

In addition, Iraq's Air Force can also deploy a huge assault wave against the major American air base King Abdul Aziz in Dhahran. This target is particularly well-defended, but it would take only a few kamikaze pilots to succeed in releasing bombs filled with these highly toxic substances to cause countless human losses. [passage omitted]

Deprived of individual and collective protection systems, the 60,000 Arab soldiers of the anti-Saddam coalition appear to be even more vulnerable. Iraqi propaganda would then have an easy task of declaring that the West has chosen to leave them defenseless, as "cannon fodder." And the alliances formed with Eastern capitals would collapse.

2. Recourse to nuclear weapons. Having only about 20 kilograms of uranium 235, Iraq will probably not have a nuclear weapon before five years. Nonetheless, it can now threaten its enemies with a limited "rudimentary" weapon, according to Don Kerr of the London Institute of Strategic Studies. [passage omitted]

It is believed that Saddam's "bomb" consists of a warhead filled with radioactive waste which would explode above the American military concentration in Saudi Arabia. Immediately, a response of the same nature would become obligatory, and for the first time since 1945, the atom would be used in a war. With all the risks that this action involves...

3. The scorched earth policy. Among Husayn's repeated threats is that of the massive destruction of oil installations. This appears to be a credible possibility, and a dramatic one for the world economy. Nearly half of the total crude reserves lie beneath this region. By burning wells, pumping stations and pipeline infrastructures, Iraq would unleash an unprecedented catastrophe. Just making a thousand petroleum complexes in Kuwait operational again would take between six months to one year of work, according to the experts...

Firm Denies Supplying Scud Guidance Equipment
*AU3101104891 Paris AFP in English 1038 GMT
31 Jan 91*

[Text] Paris, January 31 (AFP)—The French SAGEM company has denied that it had supplied equipment that might have been used in the guidance system of Scud missiles being used by Iraq.

The company, the Societe d'Applications Generales d'Electricite et de Mecanique (SAGEM), said late on Wednesday: "We formally deny that we installed or directly or indirectly supplied any guidance equipment of any kind to Iraq." In a statement on Thursday the company said that since its activities had been questioned several times in the press, it was repeating its denial.

Defense Minister Rejects CW Use in Gulf
*LD3101180491 Paris Domestic Service in French
1700 GMT 31 Jan 91*

[Text] Defense Minister Pierre Joxe announced today that tomorrow he will visit Toul Air Base on an inspection. Some Jaguars in operation in the Gulf are stationed at this base. He will next go to London to meet British Defense Minister Tom King. Joxe will soon visit Saudi Arabia.

Pierre Joxe confirmed that in case of an Iraqi chemical attack, France will not reciprocate with similar arms.

[Begin Joxe recording] The issue regarding the use of chemical weapons [CW] does not arise for France because none of its units is equipped with them. The treaty on the use of such weapons was signed by France some time ago. It banned the use and manufacture of chemical arms, and this is France's stance. You remember that this issue was debated in the past in France, and the president of the republic took a categorical and explicit stand concerning this point. Consequently, it is not only by virtue of a treaty that France is bound; France is bound by virtue of a political decision which was expressed by the president of the republic who, I repeat, is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. [end recording]

Confidential Report on Sales to Iraq Detailed

*91P40134X Paris LES ECHOS in French 1 Feb 91
pp 2-3*

[Report by Alexandre Schwartzbrod: "Weapon Deliveries to Iraq: A Confidential Report"—first paragraph is LES ECHOS introduction]

[Text] An internal memorandum to the General Secretariat for National Defense [SGDN] denies that France directly assisted Iraq with its Scud and Condor programs but leaves some doubt about assistance that may have been given indirectly.

Who sold what to Iraq? And especially when and for what purpose? These are the principal questions that for some weeks now have been troubling French weapons manufacturers because of the long tradition of cooperation which has characterized relations between Iraq and France in the military field.

Faced with a wide array of accusations—such as assisting Iraq in modernizing its Scud missiles—French authorities have recently been investigating the problem, looking for anything in the 1980's that could be considered a sale of "sensitive" materiel to Iraq, primarily in the ballistic area. Their conclusions are confusing.

Thus, according to a confidential memorandum dated 23 January 1991 and written by the General Secretariat for National Defense, "France has not contributed directly, or significantly through a third-country intermediary, to the Scud program, and in 1987 ceased all indirect participation in the development of the Condor program."

For the SGDN, there is no doubt that France never directly delivered to Iraq material likely to aid in the construction of ballistic missiles. Of course, France has sold inertia centers (guidance systems) manufactured by Sagem, but they were intended for the Mirage F-1 and for AMX-10 armored artillery vehicles. As for the F-1's, France reportedly also sold 82 inertia centers, "specifically intended" for these planes, according to the SGDN.

and for which "the number of replacements delivered in addition to the units equipping the planes is normal." As for the AMX-IO's, France reportedly delivered 92 NSM-20 guidance systems, a number which conforms to the specific needs of these vehicles. In the first case, SGDN concludes that the use of these centers on Scuds "would be complex and no doubt less efficient than the mechanisms already on the Soviet missiles;" in the second case, [their conclusion is] that it seems simply "improbable."

Via Brazil and Argentina

As for indirect French participation in the development of ballistic missiles for Iraq, the SGDN acknowledges that "France maintained commercial and cooperative relations with countries that themselves may have been able to assist Iraq." Concerning the Scuds, it is common knowledge that a team of Brazilian engineers assisted Iraq in developing air-to-air missiles, but also certainly ballistic missiles. And it is also true that for over 20 years France maintained scientific and technologic cooperation with Brazil in the space field through agreements reached between CNES [National Center for Space Studies] and its Brazilian counterpart, CTA [Aerospace Technology Center]. This cooperation clearly slackened in the late 1980's, and was then terminated, in view of doubts that existed about the Brazilians' use of this technology. "One cannot conclude that this cooperation did not have an indirect effect on the ballistic capacity of the Iraqis in improving the Scud," according to the SGDN.

As for the ground-to-ground Condor missile, developed by Iraq with Argentine assistance, France finds itself in an uncomfortable position insofar as it greatly cooperated with Argentina in developing the latter's space program starting in the early 1980's. Directly or through the intermediary of Consen, a German subsidiary of MBB, France may have delivered two or three INS-80 inertia centrals for tests, and 12 other centrals for experimental motors "which for the most part may have been used by Argentina for the development of Condor studies," SGDN notes. However, Paris reportedly stopped all deliveries of centrals to Argentina in August 1987 after the MTCR agreement (Missile Technology Regime Control) [preceding words in English] was established.

A Necessary Grooming

"After 1987, Egypt attempted to take over from Argentina in furnishing these centrals to Iraq, using the Sakr 80 or Sakr 120 missile project. In 1988, this country requested 200 Sagem MSD 80 centrals. This request was denied by Paris, which offered MSD 80 centrals of lesser precision, but adapted for the Egyptian SAKR program. Egypt rejected this offer," recalls SGDN, which underscores the necessity of reinforcing the control procedures for French-foreign space agreements in view of all this information. For the most part, these agreements are not controlled by the Interministerial Commission for Studying the Export of War Materiel (CIEEMG) which supervises all weapons sales in France.

The climate of suspicion which has taken hold in France toward these weapons manufacturers and especially toward "equippers" ("equipementiers"), explains the confusion which currently reigns in this sector. All the companies directly implicated have—at least during the last few days—filed formal and absolute denials to the rumors which allege that they violated the embargo imposed on Iraq in August [1990]. As the SGDN emphasizes, however, it is clear that the Gulf war will at least have served to demonstrate to which point the control procedures governing the transfer of "sensitive" technology to third-world countries are in need of a significant grooming.

Assistance to Iraqi Scud Program Described

91P40135A Paris *L'EXPRESS* in French 8 Feb 91
p 10-12

[Text] French intelligence services have launched an investigation into the accusations made by Eliyahu Ben-Elisar, president of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee the day following the first explosion of a Scud missile in Tel Aviv: "France is largely responsible for the current Iraqi ability to launch ballistic missiles against Israel." This allegation is being taken very seriously. The president of the Republic responded indirectly to this statement during his 20 January press conference by saying, "We have not sold any ballistic missile capable of reaching Israeli territory." This is true but does not constitute an adequate response to the accusations that Ben-Elisar made shortly afterwards to LE FIGARO: "Certain French companies have furnished high technology mechanisms which have allowed the Iraqis to upgrade their original Scuds so that their range now includes Israel."

Such accusations cannot stand without a response as long as sirens are sounding day and night in Israel and in Saudi Arabia, terrifying the populace. The statements of Thierry de Beaucé, the president's emissary, who remarked that "the question didn't even come up" after his interview with the prime minister in Jerusalem on 25 January, are scarcely credible and are even somewhat disturbing. All the more so since Lutz Stavenhagen, minister of state in the chancellor's office, when faced with the same accusations, admitted that in 1986 and 1987 German companies had assisted Iraq in increasing the range of its Scuds, thereby contributing to the proliferation of ground-to-ground and air-launched missiles, as well as of chemical warheads carried by these missiles.

It is unfortunately a known fact that French companies have done likewise. How and why?

Since the 1980's, we have seen an acceleration of this proliferation; over 20 Third World countries now have ballistic missiles. William Webster, CIA director, estimates that in the year 2000, about 15 of these countries will be capable of producing their own missiles through technology transfer. A confidential report, written in January 1988 and named "Discriminate Deterrence"

[preceding two words in English], even raises the hypothesis of a ballistic attack on the United States by Third World countries, and analyzes its consequences.

Without a doubt, the Iran-Iraq war materialized the threat: Over a thousand ballistic missiles were launched by the two countries, including several hundreds during the "city wars" in February and March 1988. This was the moment of triumph of a Soviet missile, the SS-1, whose code name in the West is Scud. With a range of 280 kilometers, the Soviet Union generously distributed the Scud B in Middle Eastern countries. But it was the Iraqis who would intensively deploy these missiles, having received the first deliveries in the 1970's. They received some 500 by the end of the war, including 350 delivered between 1986 and 1988. The Iraqis were the first to use the missiles, starting in mid-1982, when they increased their range after having been forced to retreat. Saddam Husayn then attempted to upgrade his arsenal in order to reach Tehran and other more distant Iranian cities, such as Qom and Esfahan. The project was given to General Amir Hammudi al-Sa'di, minister of industry, in charge of developing military production. He is the father of the Iraqi ballistic missile and chemical weapons program. He is also the one who organized the clandestine network for gathering technology in developed countries. On 3 August 1987, the first launch of an upgraded Scud B missile, called the al-Husayn, took place; the missile fell 615 km from its launch site. The al-Husayn, with a maximum range of 650 km, is a lengthened Scud (12.2 meters), in order to carry more liquid fuel, carries a 500 kg charge (1 tonne for the Scud B), and is accurate within 1,000 meters. More than 160 al-Husayns were launched on Tehran between late February and mid-April 1988.

The completion of the al-Husayn owes a great deal to two projects. An Egyptian project, under the aegis of the Sakr company and conducted from 1983 on with the assistance of the French company SNPE (National Company for Powders and Explosives), resulted in the Sakr 80 missile. The other project, much more complex, has been directed since 1984 by Egypt and Argentina. CITEFA (Armed Forces Scientific and Technical Research Center of Argentina) presented in 1985 a missile with "civilian applications"—the Condor 1, whose characteristics resemble those of a ground-to-ground missiles with a 100-km range. On 20 December, the Argentine defense minister announced officially that Argentina and Egypt were developing "a medium-range missile with civilian applications"—the Condor 2 (the Badr 2000 for the Egyptians). This missile, as later revealed by the Ushuaia naval base commander, has the same range as "the distance between the Malvinas [Falklands] and Argentina." In fact, in this project, Argentina was intended to serve as a screen to link the work of private European companies. And that is precisely what Argentina did by forming a secret consortium of 16 companies, named "Consen" that was based first in Monaco, then in Switzerland, and represented the latest in missile technology and equipment. Aside from the German firm

MBB (Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm), the Italian Snia-BPD, a subsidiary of Fiat, and the Swedish Bofors, is the French Sagem. This company, which specializes in optronics and guidance systems, produces inertia guidance systems. This system—which three countries in the world are capable of producing—is based on a gyroscope that enables the missile to maintain a fixed reference point in space, thereby increasing its precision. This is its brain. Among other equipment, Sagem makes the inertia guidance systems that equip the French SNLE (nuclear submarine-launched missiles) and is cultivating foreign markets. It came to participate in the Condor 2 project by supplying Argentina with just over 40 MSD 80 inertia guidance systems, of which some went to Iraq. Western and Israeli intelligence services only got wind of the Condor 2 project after the successful launch of its first missile (504 km) in Patagonia in early March 1989. In the meantime, Iraq, which had supplied most of the \$5 billion needed for the undertaking, had taken advantage of the technological spin-offs, because on 25 April 1988, the al-'Abbas, another upgraded version of the Scud B, was tested at a distance of 850 km, attained by lengthening it 13.3 meters and reducing the charge to 300 kg, for a [target] precision of under 1,500 meters. (These are the missiles currently falling on Tel Aviv and Riyadh.)

It is certain that, from the end of the war with Iran, the Iraqis decided to develop an increasingly autonomous production. The ballistic missile development project, cited in a special report by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, bears the code name "Project 395" and includes the following four projects: the Saad 16 research and development complex, directed by German and Austrian companies, near Mosul; a missile manufacturing center near al-Fallujah; the "Project 96" solid fuel production center at al-Hillah, 17 km from Baghdad (a violent explosion in August 1989 killed several Egyptian workers); and the An-Anbar Space Research Center, built in the desert near Karbala.

The missile training for the Iraqi technicians at An-Anbar was held in Brazil by CTA (Brazilian Aerospace Technology Center). According to experts, this assistance in the form of technical training proved to be decisive in starting up the Iraqi ballistic program. A French company from Toulouse, Intespace, built and now directs the Brazilian laboratories where these Iraqi technicians were trained. Intespace is a company whose shareholders include CNES [National Center for Space Studies], the Aerospace Materiel and Equipment Improvement Company (a subsidiary of SNECMA), Aerospatiale, Matra-Espace, and Alcatel-Espace. The keystone of the Brazilian space program is the Sonda 4 rocket, produced with the assistance of both German and French technology. Sagem supplies the guidance system, and, in 1988 and 1989, Intespace laboratories conducted large-scale tests to perfect the upper stages of the rocket. From this launcher, Brazil started the design of military missiles with two companies, Orbita and Avibras. In May 1987, Iraq began negotiations to purchase SS-300 Avibras missiles, derived from the Sonda 4. The negotiations failed, probably because at that time, the Iraqis

were on the verge of successfully launching the al-Husayn, of comparable capabilities.

American specialists are convinced that there was a transfer of technology between France and Iraq using Brazil as intermediary. Sagem has been called on the carpet, accused of supplying inertia guidance systems, as well as Intespace, which provided training for the Iraqi technicians and did studies for the preliminary stages of the space projects, and CNES, which signed space cooperation agreements for the installation of the Alcantara launch site and is also participating in the Brazilians' project for launching an observation satellite. And this, at the same time when the Iraqis have just asked the Brazilians to do "a feasibility study for a military observation satellite system"! But the most controversial element of Franco-Brazilian cooperation happened in the summer of 1989. Within the framework of the negotiations between SEP (European Propulsion Company), Arianespace, and the Brazilian Space Agency, there was a direct transfer of space technology: SEP's liquid-fuel Viking motor. The Americans were violently opposed to the project and called into question an alliance between Embraer (Brazil), SEP, and Aerospatiale which they say intends to effect a transfer of technology, in spite of everything.

These accusations have some justification. The Iraqis are eagerly seeking a number of indispensable components from French companies. Their necessary intermediary is a small company on Avenue Marceau whose owner is in the habit of taking trips to Baghdad and was even wounded on the Iran-Iraq front. Their finance company is Montana Investissement [Montana Investments], a Panamanian company with Iraqi capital that is a shareholder in Hachette.

At the same time, Egyptian officials were making a demarche in Paris with Sagem for an order of nearly 200 MSD-80 inertia guidance systems. Sagem supplied them with five for use in testing. Mysteriously warned about this, an Israeli diplomat made a demarche with Remy Paurat, domestic security advisor at the prime minister's office, to warn the French Government that in reality the order was destined for Iraq. The French then offered their "clients" some MSL-800 guidance systems that were of lesser quality and were more affected by speed and noise. The Egyptians did not pursue the matter.

In fact, current Israeli accusations appear to bear on a missile performance upgrade regarding their propulsion rather than guidance systems. French companies reportedly also contributed to improvements in the reliability and power of the motors that equip the modified Scuds. "French know-how on this subject is better than the Germans," a specialist emphasized. Does this mean that other companies—or even the same ones—have also supplied motor components with special alloys or coatings that require advanced fibre or ceramic technology?

The investigation by specialized services should clarify the subject. Now, the French contribution seems undeniable even if it is difficult to precisely outline it in the confusion of collaborations that Iraq has profited from. At any rate, this contribution goes beyond the addition of a few rocket motor components. The real problem is that of ballistic missile proliferation. It is likely that the measures aimed at preventing proliferation will be strengthened in the next few years. Such measures already exist and were made public on 16 April 1987 by seven countries—Germany, Great Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Italy, and the United States—with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

After three years of existence, one can see the results! The MTCR explicitly authorizes the transfer of technology and space equipment but solely for civilian purposes. However, the boundary is very difficult to define in this area. All the more so given that, if current space technology leaders developed civilian projects based on military experiments, Third World countries are today doing exactly the opposite.

GERMANY

Government Office To Combat Illegal Exports

*LD2401145291 Hamburg DPA in German 1251 GMT
24 Jan 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government intends to use the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to prevent illegal exports.

Minister of state in the Chancellor's Office, Lutz Stavenhagen [CDU], said today that this requires a change in the law because so far the Office for the Protection of the Constitution has only been allowed to operate in the fields of counterespionage, the investigation of constitution-threatening extremism, and the combating of terrorism.

The Federal Government notes with outrage, he said, that "some German firms are still attempting to make dirty deals with Iraq." The fact that this could not only break the UN embargo but also put Iraq in a position to continue to threaten Israel makes it all the more reprehensible. This "immoral striving for profit" cannot be justified in any way, Stavenhagen said. The last loopholes for illegal technology transfer to Iraq must now be closed. It is thus necessary to step up efforts "to expose illegal arms practices at an early stage." The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is the appropriate authority for this, he said.

SPD, FDP Reject Proposal To Curb Arms Trade

*AU2801163391 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 28 Jan 91 p 1*

[Helmut Loelhoeffel report: "Intelligence Service Should Tap Telephones of Suspicious Export Companies"]

[Text] Bonn, 27 January—The Office for the Protection of the Constitution should be authorized to monitor

business mail and telephones of those companies suspected of illegal exports of dangerous goods such as arms, nuclear materiel, or chemical plants. According to a proposal on how to formulate these regulations, drawn up by the FRG Interior Ministry in Bonn and made available to FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, such steps must be possible even for "preparatory actions." In initial statements made on Sunday, both the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] and the Free Democratic Party of Germany [FDP] strictly rejected this idea.

A letter from Hans Neusel, state secretary in the Interior Ministry, to Dieter von Wuerzen, state secretary in the FRG Economics Ministry, dated 22 January, contains two fully formulated proposals to "improve export control." Both the federal and laender branches of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should thus be authorized to examine "the preliminary activities of sensitive exports," which, under the current law, is only legal in the case of espionage or danger to the state through the use of force. According to Neusel, a new task is to be incorporated in the law on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution: to examine all "legal transactions and actions in the foreign trade sector as well as all preparatory activities in this connection which might endanger the security of the state or one of the FRG's land or foreign policy issues, in particular the peaceful coexistence of the peoples."

Moreover, an appendix is to be made to the law on restricting the secrecy of mail, postal communications, and telecommunications (G-10 Law) according to which, in the future, violations of Article 10 of the Basic Law (inviolability of postal and telephone communications) are possible also in the event of "crimes under Paragraph 34 of the Foreign Trade Law" (that is to say in the event of illegal exports). In this connection, Neusel added that "considering the severity of such crimes, there are no reservations against such an appendix."

Willfried Penner, deputy floor leader of the SPD Bundestag group, who is responsible for domestic policy issues, told FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU that he "strictly rejects" such additional powers being given to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, "because by their very nature, these issues belong to the realm of police tasks." Intelligence services must not be burdened with police activities. The way Neusel put things suggests "that this would open a virtually unlimited area for observations by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution."

When asked about this matter, Burkhard Hirsch, domestic policy spokesman of the FDP Bundestag group, told FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU that he "fears that such extended authority will also be demanded for other crimes. This would make the Office for the Protection of the Constitution a police authority that works on the basis of suspicions," Hirsch added. He

asked: "Where are the boundaries of preliminary activities?" He warned in particular against the intended monitoring of telephone and postal communications. Detlef Kleinert, legal affairs spokesman of the FDP Bundestag group, also argued that this would "go far beyond the legal framework for the activities of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, a framework which quite rightly has been kept very narrow." The prosecutor general and the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations should be responsible here, Kleinert added. Alfred Einwag, the federal commissioner for data protection, has stated that he had reservations against using the Office for the Protection of the Constitution against illegal arms exports.

Reports on German Aid to Iraqi Missile, CW Program

DER SPIEGEL Report

AU2901221591 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
28 Jan 91 pp 24-27

[Unattributed report: "My Cousin in Baghdad"]

[Text] The rooms in the dreary high-rise office building in Neu-Isenburg looked like a missile workshop. The investigators found drawings of kerosene tanks, testing stands, propulsion parts, and stabilizers.

The investigators soon realized whose orders the technicians in the small town in southern Hesse were carrying out: The files contained 300 thick folders of correspondence with Arab countries. Saddam Husayn's weapons purchasers were their partners.

The question as to what service the Havert Consult Project Engineering company at 61 Herzogstrasse in Neu-Isenburg provided to dictator Husayn was easy to answer after a search of the stores last week: The investigators found a National People's Army leaflet. It contained instructions for the assembly of the Russian "Scud-B" missile—the model of the missiles with which Husayn is now terrifying Israel.

For nearly a decade the small enterprise apparently helped Iraq unimpeded to build its missiles. It was only one of many companies.

Intelligence services and governments are currently preparing lists of companies that participated in Iraq's Scud-B program. It has so far not been possible to determine the exact share of development aid from France, Italy, Great Britain, and Brazil. However, one thing is certain: The Germans were the most important helpers. Public prosecutors have meanwhile discovered blueprints for the complete Scud-B missile in the former GDR. Weapons specialists of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution proceed from the assumption that the Soviet missiles were for years built in the former GDR for Iraq on the basis of such documents. If this is true, the vague estimates of the allies concerning Saddam's Scud arsenal are probably far too low.

As the Bonn Economics Ministry stated in a confidential report last August, in West Germany it was primarily "medium-sized German enterprises" which, with entrepreneurial spirit and business sense, helped place Israel within the range of Iraqi warheads.

West German companies competed with their offers to supply missile technology to the Arab dictator. The former weapons dealer, Friedrich Simon Heiner, for example, provided missile parts to Baghdad through the Inwako GmbH company in Bonn. Investigations are also under way against his Kiel partner, Klaus Weihe, who apparently wanted to supply tubes and machine parts to Iraq through a Jordanian firm last August before the embargo was imposed.

People know each other in this line of business. Heiner had contacts with a renowned company for navigation plants and electronic components, C. Plath KG in Hamburg. Customs investigators paid a visit to that company last September. It is believed to have been working on an order for the Iraqi missile program involving millions of German marks [DM].

The Hamburg enterprise is also suspected of having built gyrocompasses for the Iraqi Scud-B missiles. With the help of such compasses, the flight path of missiles can be corrected.

The company had declared the instruments as locating equipment for oil drilling. However, technicians were irritated by the fact that the assembly instructions were written in Russian.

An inquiry is also in process against the entrepreneur Werner Beaujean from Stutensee near Karlsruhe and the Tramic Industry Foreign Trade company near Neusenburg. Manager Eberhard Hesse-Camozzi is believed to have organized missile deals with Iraq. The missiles were mainly built with the help of dealers. They bought parts from well-known concerns. Sometimes the big companies carried out such deals directly.

Thyssen Industrie AG, for example, wanted to supply 300 so-called two-component pumps for the propulsion of the Scud-B missile to Iraq. The pumps inject the different fuels into the motor of the missile. Thyssen Industrie had already built the first 25 turbo pumps at the Witten-Annen works and sent them to Baghdad.

However, in June 1990 the managers terminated the program. The deal had become too hot.

The Bochum public prosecutor is investigating that case now. It will probably be difficult for Ulrich Berntzen, a member of the managing board of Thyssen Industrie who is responsible for that area, to claim that he did not know anything because the drawings for the pumps came from Iraq, and the producers hardly had any doubt as to the future use of the equipment.

Saddam Husayn would hardly have been able to build his missiles without Western technology. Considerable expenditures were necessary to modernize the estimated

1,000 outdated missiles supplied by the Soviet Union and North Korea, which only had a range of 300 km and were not very accurate.

The Iraqi Scud missiles now have a range of 600 km, which is sufficient to threaten Israel. The "al-Husayn" is a modernized version.

A more sophisticated version is the "al-Abbas" missile, which allegedly has a range of 900 km. Such a range is possible because of special fuel tanks. These missiles are apparently also of German origin.

The codes 1728 and 144—the names of projects involving the conversion of the old Scuds—were known to several German companies. Most of the Scuds were converted in the Iraqi town of al-Fallujah west of Baghdad where, according to information received by intelligence services, mainly North Koreans and GDR specialists assembled the missiles.

The fact that the Germans received so many orders was not only due to their high-class workmanship. It was also due to Lieutenant General Amir al-Saadi, who was in charge of all missiles and poison gas projects.

The deputy industry minister studied in the FRG in the sixties, speaks German fluently, and is married to a German. He organized the translation of most of the assembly instructions from Russian into German—as a reading aid for the helpers.

The friend of the Germans, al-Saadi, is also in charge of Project 395. That is the code for a project under which weapons specialists are trying at three worksites southeast of Baghdad to extend the two-stage "Condor II" missile developed by the Germans by another stage. However, the new super weapon (1,200 km range), which would have been able to transport small weights into space, was not yet completed when the war broke out.

No wish of the Iraqi ruler was apparently too megalomaniac for the Germans to fulfill: Iraq even got construction drawings for the propulsion mechanism of the new European "Ariane" rocket, whose start is planned for 1995. The propulsion mechanism was built by Thyssen-Wagner in Dortmund.

Such deals were apparently made possible by the generosity with which FRG politicians and authorities viewed the transfer of technology to Iraq for many years. During the war with Iran, some even considered it opportune to support Saddam against the dangerous Iranian Khomeini. West German authorities must have felt encouraged to loosen the controls of the arms export law when they heard the liberal economic expert Graf Lambsdorff swagger publicly about double standards of missiles deals.

"If your opinion would prevail, my late brother-in-law who helped the Americans fly to the moon, would be punished and imprisoned," the FDP [Free Democratic

Party of Germany] leader told SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Deputy Norbert Gansel in 1989, who criticized weapons exports.

Lambsdorff showed particular naivete when he defended weapons exports: "As is known, missiles can also be used for peaceful purposes. They can be used to launch satellites, for example."

What the Germans caused with their exports will probably not become completely clear until ground combat starts at the Kuwaiti border.

Baghdad will probably use BM-21 missile launchers. It is a terrible weapon. Arranged in batteries, they can launch 500 missiles within a very short period, completely covering an area. Many of them are filled with poison gas, which was produced with German help.

The most recent findings have revealed that tens of thousands of shells and short-range missiles were filled with the deadly poison at the chemical plants of Samarra, which were essentially built by Germans.

At the plants supplied to Samarra by the Karl Kolb GmbH company from Dreieich in Hesse, the warfare agents tabun, mustard gas, and the blood cell poison prussic acid were produced over a period of at least three years. The quantity is estimated at 700 kg per shift; five liters are sufficient to fill one shell.

The filling plant is located 2 km from the poison gas plant, at the edge of the factory's premises. Shell bodies and small missiles (120 and 122.4 calibers) were filled with poison gas—with German high-class workmanship.

The Hamburg company Water Engineering Trading (W.E.T.) also supplied a screwing pipes plant to Samarra, suitable for opening and closing the missiles. Filling equipment worth DM7 million, also delivered by W.E.T., introduces the gas into the shell bodies.

Whereas the shells and missiles were formerly supplied with the teflon coating, known from space technology, Iraq soon started coating the missiles itself. The Lab Consult company in Hesse, which is closely linked with Karl Kolb GmbH, helped, by means of a coating machine, to seal the internal walls of the shells with the high-quality material halar.

The synthetic material, based on ethylene and chlorine fluorinated triethylene, shows high thermal and chemical resistance. Poison gas cannot leak from halar-coated containers and can be stored there for a long time.

The filling technology for poison gas shows particularly well how dependent the Iraqi military is on German supplies. Recent findings in Bonn have revealed that Saddam is not able to fill the large Scud-B warheads with poison gas because he has so far only received loading equipment for small missiles.

According to experts, that is why Saddam has so far not used poison gas against Israel.

However, poison gas missiles and shells have apparently been transported to the front in great quantities. Thanks to the Italian firm Snia Techint, a subsidiary of Dynamit Nobel, there has been no shortage of ammunition so far. The arms company is believed to have produced at least 25,000 122.4-mm missile bodies, which have reached Iraq via Jordan.

In Germany such deals are banned, but do not involve great risks. Despite the fact that several hundred dubious companies have supplied weapons to Iraq, a mere dozen of them will face trial. It is difficult for public prosecutors and courts to provide evidence.

Those charged with offenses spare no effort to cover up their lucrative deals. The public prosecutors were stunned by the tactics used by the management of the Gildemeister Engineering Works.

As the general contractor, the Gildemeister subsidiary, Projecta GmbH, established the largest military research center in the Middle East in the Iraqi town of Mosul. According to government findings, missiles and aircraft that can be used for military purposes and other military equipment are tested or developed at the complex, which is worth DM1.6 million.

The investigators have discovered bundles of documents on the project and on Gildemeister's involvement. The documents also prove the military nature of the deal. However, the managers continue to claim that "laboratories and workshops that can be compared with facilities in universities, technical training shops, and testing institutes" are involved.

A letter from 1985 to the Iraqi partner, which has been discovered recently, shows how Gildemeister tried to cover up the deal. Since the company did not get the export permit for a wind tunnel, in which multiple sonic speed can be simulated, the managers resorted to a trick. They simply changed the export documents and told the Iraqis: "The equipment that will be supplied will conform to the original contract." Now the public prosecutors not only have to prove that the wind tunnel was actually supplied, but they will also have to produce evidence during the trial expected to take place this year that the managers knew about the planned military use from the beginning.

That might be somewhat easier in the Ferrostaal case. The Essen-based concern supplied a gun factory to Taji in Iraq in 1987 as the general contractor. Since its completion in the summer of last year, 122- to 203-mm guns have been produced there.

As a matter of fact, the plant was officially declared a universal smithy. However, the Ferrostaal managers will not get away with assertions that they did not know about the planned use of the plant. The responsible Ferrostaal officials will be facing trial this summer. In this extremely rare case, a member of the management

board will also appear in court. According to investigators' findings, Klaus von Menges is believed to be the person mainly responsible for the deal.

Authorities in Bavaria would hardly have prosecuted the managers. No matter how serious allegations were, all affairs involving weapons deals were settled quietly. The Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) weapons company, with a DM70 million share, was Gildemeister's most important subcontractor in Mosul. However, investigations have not been initiated against MBB.

MBB's supply of helicopters to Iraq—equipped with guns in Spain—not result in any consequences either. Despite the fact that the concern had an 11-percent share in the Spanish company Casa, the managers from Munich pretend not to have known anything about the transaction. MBB displayed the same attitude in connection with the export of blueprints for the production of the fuel-air explosive (FAE), which has the explosive power of a small atomic bomb. Studies on the dangerous weapon reached MBB via the United States and Switzerland.

The concern tested the explosive and passed on the blueprints to a small Bavarian partner company. From there the documents reached Baghdad via Egypt.

At the military show in Baghdad in 1989, Saddam proudly presented his first FAE bombs. MBB was able to carry out some of the weapons deals quite legally. Through the German-French sales company Euromissiles (MBB, 50 percent share) Saddam Husayn bought his 5,000 antitank missiles and 166 "Hot" rocket launchers and 4,550 "Milan" twin systems.

Baghdad ordered 1,050 German-French "Roland" anti-aircraft missiles. The trade with this partly French company did not even fall under German export law.

Many German supplies for another weapons sector—the Iraqi research into bacteriological weapons—were entirely unobjectionable from a legal point of view. West German companies specialized in laboratory equipment supplied to Baghdad, for example, culture media for breeding plague, cholera, and anthrax. Even minor quantities of mycotoxins, which can cause cancer even when strongly diluted, might have been supplied without authorization. Restrictions were imposed only just over a year ago.

No wonder that in view of such a booming business with Iraq, the infamous Chilean arms company, Cardoen, was lured into going to Germany. With capital from Swiss numbered accounts, company chief Carlos Cardoen founded the shipping agency Cifco in Bremen. Starting in the summer of 1989, Cifco supplied a complete plant for bomb fuses to Iraq.

Matrix Churchill of Coventry, England, which was controlled by Iraqi front men, was an important customer of Cifco's. Since the customs authorities of Bremen had the

reputation of being very lax, Matrix sent all important machinery to Baghdad via Bremen.

The cover company Cifco was closely observed only after urgent entreaties by British customs authorities. Even that did not prevent that strange shipping agency—where lawyer Rudolf Monnerjahn (SPD), a deputy in the Bremen parliament, served as an authorizing authority for a long time—from supplying machinery components to Chile even during the Iraq embargo. It is not expected that those goods are still there.

Owner Carlos Cardoen is a close friend of Saddam Husayn's, whom he refers to as "my cousin in Baghdad." Before the war the Chilean, with his branch in Bremen, did about 90 percent of his business with Baghdad.

For example, for his "cousin" he set up a plant for "cluster bombs," which are able to spit out 240 mini warheads in midair, thus—according to a company leaflet—"widely destroying" an area of 50,000 square meters.

Cardoen does not understand why he is now being charged with those deliveries. His motto is that "making weapons" is nothing but "applied engineering." It sounds as if he picked up that slogan in Germany.

Minister Confirms Aid

LD3001134891 Hamburg DPA in German 1159 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal minister of economic affairs has confirmed that German firms collaborated on the upgrading of Soviet Scud missiles in Iraq. The results of the state prosecutor's investigation, however, can not be anticipated. This happened without the knowledge of the Federal Government. The export authorities were possibly deceived, said a spokesman for the ministry on Wednesday in response to questions.

The television magazine program "Panorama" reported on Tuesday [29 January] evening that Bonn gave guarantees for the missile projects in Iraq. The Economic Affairs Ministry spokesman said that, in the case mentioned by "Panorama," the firm gave false information. In 1988 it had received guarantees for the production of 35 compressed air devices, the export of which to Iraq required no license at the time. It was only after the deal had been completed in 1989 that it came out that the project was a military one.

TV Program Cited

LD2901200291 Hamburg DPA in German 1815 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The modernization and upgrading of Iraqi Scud missiles was promoted by the Federal Government through guarantees, the television magazine program Panorama has claimed. Services by German companies for the Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn were covered by Bonn with a Hermes [export

credit] guarantee, the NDR [North German Radio] reported on Tuesday evening.

According to Panorama, Iraq would not have been able to upgrade the Soviet Scud missile in such a way that it could reach Israel without the help of German firms. Since the middle of 1988 Baghdad has given our contracts to Federal German firms, especially to so-called technology dealers. At least 20 German firms have supplied valves, intake jets, pumps and pressure tanks, as well as production and testing equipment, among other things, for Husayn's missile project.

According to Panorama, since August 1989 the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Federal Office of the Economy in Eschborn—which is responsible for granting export licenses—and the Federal Intelligence Service have known that project numbers given in business papers were in fact code numbers for an Iraqi missile program. In spite of this knowledge, the Eschborn office, in isolated instances, granted licences for some of the parts ordered from Germany by Iraq, even after autumn 1989.

A confidential paper from the Bonn Foreign Ministry of 4 January 1990, which is in the hands of Panorama, proves the Federal Government's share of responsibility for the export of missile technology to Iraq. According to this, the Federal Intelligence Service had information showing that a "manufacturing risk guarantee" (Hermes guarantee) for some 1.5 million German marks was granted. This happened with the consent of the minister of finance and in agreement with the minister of economic cooperation.

Kohl on New Vision of NATO, European Security

LD3001121491 Berlin ADN in German 1133 GMT
30 Jan 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—In the foreign policy section of his government statement on Wednesday, Chancellor Helmut Kohl calls for a change in the existing NATO strategy. In view of the political change in Europe and the reduction in East-West confrontation, NATO has not become superfluous by any means. But a new concept, which the Federal Republic of Germany is working on intensively, requires a new strategy "which is based less on nuclear weapons and which fundamentally transforms the existing forward defense."

This includes a political framework "which continues to ensure the security and stability in Europe and is based to a greater extent on controlled reduction of forces, confidence-building measures, active crisis management, and conflict prevention, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes." What is indispensable is the presence of North American forces "in West Europe and on German soil."

The Federal Government, Kohl says, is sticking to its aim of "creating peace with fewer weapons." After the German decision to reduce the forces of the united

Germany to 370,000 men, the Federal Government expected that the other partners would also take measures to limit their forces to national maximum numbers.

Kohl wants the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, signed in Paris, to be ratified quickly, as "the foundation of a new, pan-European security structure" and wants to see it implemented "according to the spirit and the letter."

The chancellor is also strongly in favor of the earliest possible start to American-Soviet negotiations on nuclear short-range systems. The changed security policy situation in Europe now permits the removal of land-based short-range nuclear missiles and of nuclear artillery shells in the whole of Europe.

GDR Supported Iraq's Chemical Weapons Armament

AU0502113091 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
1 Feb 91 p 4

[ADN report: "For Dollars the GDR Let Ethics Go Down the Drain"]

[Text] Berlin—From 1980-87, following the model of a poison gas facility of the National Peoples' Army [NVA] in Storkow in the GDR, East German experts built a chemical test site near Baghdad, where GDR military unscrupulously passed on their experience with chemical weapons. By means of the transfer of know-how Honecker's government, which was greedy for foreign currency from the very beginning, hoped to be able to benefit from Iraq's "slumbering economic power." For Iraqi petrodollars the GDR let all ethics go down the drain.

"In the Arab area we have always had problems standing up to Western competitors," retired Colonel Herbert Mueller recalls, who was responsible until September 1990 for all GDR military attaches stationed outside Europe. In an interview with ADN, he denied however, that the NVA "armed" Saddam Husayn, whose "desires for aggression" were known to the GDR military.

Karlheinz Lohs, professor for disarmament and chemical weapons in Leipzig, does not believe this version. After a reception by the GDR military attache in Baghdad in spring 1972 he was invited by members of Husayn's general staff. "After my lecture a general stood up and said ... we Germans had so much experience in gassing Jews and what did I think of how this experience could be used for destroying Israel." The GDR Foreign Ministry never reacted to his report about this—as Lohs said—"shocking" incident.

Lohs probably did not properly read Honecker's mouth-piece NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. In October 1971 GDR Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann returned from the first and only visit by a GDR military man to Iraq with great euphoria: "It was often said that our success was

their success and the other way round. Everywhere it was stressed by the people we spoke to and, of course, also by us that the Middle East and Central Europe are two important areas of a unified struggle, the struggle against imperialism."

According to Mueller, Iraq subsequently demonstratively turned a cold shoulder to the GDR; for instance, the military visit was not returned. At the beginning of the war against Iran in 1980 "normal relations" were reestablished, which, however—and the chief military attache claimed not to have heard about this—also included the training of combat swimmers [Kampfschwimmer] in Iraq as well as aid for modernizing Soviet Scud-B missiles. "Of course, I cannot rule out that the State Security Service and Schalck-Golodkowski's Commercial Coordination organization also worked with Iraq, apart from us."

As insiders noticed, when leaving the NVA at the end of September, 1990 high-ranking NVA officers had to state in writing to the Bundeswehr that they would not talk about "sensitive service secrets."

The then management of the Engineering Technical Foreign Trade organization (ITA) also insisted on its "duty of secrecy" when the Kuwait crisis broke out. As an arms trading company, ITA was subordinate to Foreign Trade Minister Gerhard Beil, whose sphere of responsibility also officially included the Commercial Coordination empire. Until the end the GDR exported one-tenth of its arms production, which was not needed at home.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Thuringia

*LD0102224391 Berlin ADN in German 1848 GMT
1 Feb 91*

[Text] Erfurt (ADN)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Thuringia has started and will be concluded next year. It proceeds according to the deployment and withdrawal treaty in good collaboration with the Bundeswehr and local authorities. This was stated on Friday by Lieutenant General Leonid Kovalev, commander of the Soviet troops in Nohra, during his first formal visit to the prime minister of Thuringia, Josef Duchscherer.

The prime minister promised General Kovalev every support he can offer for the complicated troop withdrawal from Thuringia which will temporarily cause local traffic problems.

He welcomed the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces will be holding an open house 17 February at their regiments in Weimar, Jena, Meiningen, and Naumburg to familiarize Thuringia citizens with the soldiers' everyday life and to help reduce further possible reservations against them.

USSR Demand for Troop-Withdrawal Money Denied

*LD0402151891 Berlin ADN in German 1445 GMT
4 Feb 91*

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN)—The Federal Government has rejected press reports according to which the Soviet Union has demanded more money for financing its troop withdrawals from eastern Germany. Government Spokesman Dieter Vogel said in Bonn today that no such USSR requests have been received. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Soviet Tactical Missiles, Naval Infantry Said Counter to CFE

*91WC0047A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
25 Jan 91 p 8*

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "More Scud Missiles on Kola"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] The Soviet Union is continuing to deploy Scud missiles on Kola. This is apparent from the Norwegian edition of *Military Balance*, which is now available. The tactical SS-21 missile is also being deployed in the area near Norway.

It is presumed that the Soviet edition of the Scud missile is more accurate than the Iraqi versions that are raining down these days on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, it is not an especially accurate weapon. But the lack of accuracy is made up for by the fact that the missile can be equipped with powerful nuclear weapons, a total of 10-200 kilotons. The same applies to the SS-21, which is estimated to be more accurate than the Scud. There are 12 Scud launchers on Kola and four for the SS-21, according to *Military Balance*, which is published by the Norwegian Atlantic Pact Committee. Every year, the committee puts in a great deal of work in order to issue this main source of knowledge about the military situation in areas close to Norway.

President Mikhail Gorbachev gave assurances a while back that the Soviet Union had withdrawn all nuclear weapons that could be used only against the Nordic area. But not long afterwards the Supreme Commander in North Norway, Lieutenant General Dagfinn Danielsen, was able to report that Soviet nuclear missiles were observed in an exercise near the Norwegian border. The statement awakened great attention on the Soviet side and Kremlin spokesmen attempted to refute Danielsen. And now *Military Balance* as well asserts that these special nuclear weapons have not been removed as was maintained and, from their positions on Kola, they can only be used against Norway and Finland.

From the overview of the collective arsenal of Soviet nuclear weapons, land based as well as airborne and sea based, it appears that there are still more tactical

weapons farther south, in the Leningrad Military District. Also on Kola, there is an abundant selection that can be delivered both from planes and vessels. These are weapons that are not included in the nuclear power balance between the great powers, but are presumably set aside for local actions.

The Soviet Northern Fleet is undergoing modernization and reorganization. According to the *Military Balance* there is a large number—around 10—of Yankee class submarines under reconstruction in order to be able to carry long-range cruise missiles that threaten targets in Europe and Scandinavia. Formally seen, this is not an evasion of the INF Treaty but, in fact, it means that targets which previously were covered by the land-based SS-20 missiles can not be covered by missiles from the former Yankee submarines. *Military Balance* does not envisage that unilateral force reductions at sea that Gorbachev announced in his address at the United Nations on 9 December 1988 will have an effect on the Northern Fleet's combat strength. With transfer of more modern ships with greater striking power, it is probable that the Soviet Union will keep or even increase its combat potential in both a strategic and an operational regard, even if the total number of vessels is reduced as a result of scrapping discarded models.

New Infantry Brigade

The land forces on Kola have in recent years been modernized both with regard to mobility and firepower. Modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, battle helicopters, and armed transport helicopters have been added. A new naval infantry unit, the 12th Naval Infantry Brigade, is being established in the Serebryanskiy area, northeast of Murmansk, asserts *Military Balance*. This is new. From before, it is known that a naval infantry brigade is deployed in the Pechenga valley, close by the Norwegian border. This is a special unit for offensive operations, and it is hardly calculated for other than the nearby regions.

It also appears from *Military Balance* that the 77th Motorized Infantry Division in Arkhangelsk has been transferred to the navy and rechristened a "coast guard division." The same is the case with an artillery brigade in Viborg, in the southern part of the military district, and the 3rd Guards motorized infantry division in Klaipeda, in the Baltic Military District. The intention is

probably to evade the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] disarmament treaty. Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst has protested strongly against this and has given the Soviet Union a deadline of the end of February to come up with a credible explanation of the organizational changes.

SPAIN

Expert on Iraqi Chemical, Biological Capability

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[Interview with Colonel Manuel Ros Linares, director of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Military School, by Matias Prats at the TVE-1 studio in Madrid, Spain—live]

[Text] [Prats] Good afternoon, colonel. Is there a real possibility of a nuclear confrontation?

[Ros Linares] I do not think so, because Iraq has not had enough time to produce these weapons. Now, regarding what I just heard about Iraq's small chemical weapons capability, I would say that it has a rather large capability.

[Prats] Does it have a chemical and biological capability?

[Ros Linares] I would say that Iraq does not have the capacity to wage biological warfare. Biological warfare is very complicated and it requires the participation of excellent specialists. It is not easy to wage a biological war because it has a boomerang effect. That is, whatever weapons are used against the enemy can also hurt the person using them. This also creates serious international problems. For example, the fumes could be carried back to Iraq because of the fires in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, I do not think there is enough room to wage biological warfare.

In addition, biological warfare would require enormous secrecy because all of the personnel, military and civilian, would have to be vaccinated against the biological agent used against the enemy.

[Prats] And the agent that would be used would also have to remain secret?

[Ros Linares] Exactly.

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